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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to explore the
notion, and demonstrate that current patterns of family
Interaction are related to different levels of adjustment
In childhood. On the operational level, differences in
patterns of interaction on the prisoner's dilemma game
(Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) were studied in families
with children who had varying degrees of self-esteem
(Coopersmith, 1967). Self-esteem was viewed as an
important index of psychological adjustment. The
prisoner's dilemma game is a laboratory interaction
task which was used to simulate a naturalistic,
interpersonal situation. It was believed that this
method would allow us to draw Inferences about
differences in patterns of family interaction which
are related to the development of emotional disturbance
in childhood
2a) GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
The orientation of much of the recent literature
dealing with interaction patterns within the family
has been directed towards understanding the development
of childhood psychopathology. Bermann (1966) sketches
the evolution of this interest from its roots in early
psychoanalytic writings to the present, where the influence
of learning theory, communication theory, sociology
and sophisticated research techniques have become Joined
together. The present study has two major roots? a
dissatisfaction with previous research and conceptual-
izations of the etiology of emotional disturbance, and
the advent of new approacthes to treatment revolving
around the family.
The traditional conceptual and research model
that has been applied to childhood psychopathology is
one in which the child's present (aberrant) behavior
is viewed as a function of past parental behavior. Ross
(1964) points to the general acceptance of conceptualiza-
tions relating infantile and childhood experiences to
later personality formation in spite of the fact that
this relationship has never been established unequivocally
by controlled studies. Similarly, studies of the relation
3ship of parental attitudes and emotional disturbance
(Ross, 1964 j Prank, 1965) have not been able to discriminate
among different diagnostic groups. It has become
increasingly apparent (Ross, 1964* Handel, 19651 Hobbs,
1966 ) that the traditional theoretical approach in
which the child*s psychopathology ls related in a
unidirectional, linear fashion to a particular causal
event, such as a parental behavior or attitude, has not
been fruitful. The lack of specific empirical validation
for hypotheses describing the relationship between
parental events, including those resulting from attitudlnal
states, and childhood behavior, may be seen as one source
of the impetus to the development of new, family-centered,
behaviorally oriented models.
The conceptual and research model that would be
derived from a family-centered view of the etiology of
childhood psychopathology concieves of the child's
present (aberrant) behavior as a function of the present
lntrafamllial interactions! that is current behavioral
events within the family system. Jackson (1965) believes
that only "when we attend to the transactions between
people as primary data that a qualitative shift in
conceptual framework (from individual to family theory)
can be achieved." Concepts such as symptoms, defenses
4and character structure, are seen as terms describing
the individuals *s typical interactions which occur in
response to particular interpersonal contexts. The
stress on studying interactional as opposed to intra-
individual processes is one of the basic differences
between the tradional viewpoint and family theory.
This emphasis on present interactions in the family
would seem to be closely allied with the behavior
modification point of view (Ullman & Krasner, 1965)
;
both assume that the present behavior of an individual
is supported by other individuals* present behavior.
Prom the viewpoint of this model of family interaction
process, the basic unit of data must oonsist of a
measurement of an interaction between at least two family
members. In addition, Haley ( 1962 ) notes the following
as the basic assumptions of family research 1 "a) family
members deal differently with each other then they do
with other people, b) the millions of responses that
family members meet over time within the family fall
into patterns, c) these patterns persist within a
fmily for many years and will influence a child's
expectations of, and behavior with, other people when
he leaves the family, and d) the child is not a passive
recipient of what his parents do to him but and active
5co-creator of family relations." An additional assumption
of this model (Meisner, 1964* Ross, 1964| Handel, 1965)
is that the family must be conceived of as a functioning
unit, and that the functioning of the individual members
of the family can only be understood in refrence to the
overall structure of the family system.
b) THERAPY RELATED CONSIDERATIONS.
These theoretical considerations have paralleled
the development of family therapy in which the focus
of attention has moved from the individual patient to
the entire family unit. Family therapy (Mottola, 1967)
is based upon the notion that the interaction between
family members are both the cause of and affected by
the primary patient’s "apparent symptomatology". Although
the theoretical and conceptual foundations for family
therapy appear to be intuitively quite palatable to
many clinicians, they have not, thus far, been substantiated
by empirical data.
Perhaps the best known hypothesis which utilizes
this model to explain the family’s influence on the
development of emotional disturbance in childhood is
Vogel and Bell’s (I960) notion of scapegoating. They
6suggest that through scapegoating the child the parents
are able to resolve indirectly tensions which they have
previously been unable to resolve through direct
communication. The child is seen as the appropriate
family member to deal with family tensions because
i
a) he is relatively powerless, b) his personality is
still quite flexible so that it can readily be molded
to accept the particular role which the family assigns,
and c) he has relatively few tasks to perform in the
family compared with the parents, and his disturbance
will ordinarily interfere least with the successful
performance of the necessary family tasks. At the
present time no explanation has been offered as to which
of several children will be chosen to be the family
scapegoat. Most theorists view the family as an efficient
system so that it may be expected that the choice would
be influenced by several variables such as parental
Jealousy, a child's lack of ability in sin area that
is important to one of the parents, or possibly
because of an unfortunate identification of the child
with one of the family's prevalent myths.
Murrell and Stachowiak (1965) similarly point
to the underlying sources of tension between family
members. These authors agree with Vogel and Bell (I960)
on the function that the disturbed child serves in the
7family. By focusing on one child the disturbed family
is able to encapsulate problems which could potentially
disrupt the stable family structure. Therefore, the
primary pupose that the dlstrubed child serves is that
he permits the family to maintain its solidarity, or
in other words allows for the maintenance of a relatively
comfortable homeostasis within the family in spite of
existent interpersonal conflicts.
c) RESEARCH ON FAMILY THEORY.
Haley (1962) states that the major problem in
family research is "to measure how a small group with
a history typically respond to each other, while
attempting to ellimlnate as much as possible the effect
of that particular setting on their performance." The
research design that has been used most often to study
family processes is to bring the family group together
and study the way they interact in interviews where the
members are asked standard questions or exposed jointly
to a task. Two sorts of measurements have frequently
been usedi a tabulation of the responses to the task
by frequency or time and a categorization of the verbal
interchanges of the family.
In the recent literature several studies ( Haley
1
81964, 1967a, 1967b i Ferreira & Winter, 19661 Murrell &
Stachowiak, 1966) have addressed themselves to the
problem of whether it can be demonstrated that the family
Is an organized group, and If so do the patterns of
interaction in families with a disturbed child differ
from those in normal families. The measure used in these
studies was a tabulation of the frequency within dyads 1
i.e. mother speaks to father, mother speaks to child,
child speaks to mother, et cetera. Organization was
thought to be a departure from a rnadom distribution
of the frequencies in these dyads.
In Haley's (1964) initial study, the family group
was made up of a mother, father and one sibling. The
results of this study indicated that the patterns of
interaction within the family were organized, (i.e,
the sequences of who spoke to whom and after whom were
not random.) The more disturbed families showed a more
limited organization in their patterns of interaction
than did the normal families.
Haley found that in the normal group the mother-
child interchange was most frequent, while in the
abnormal group the mother-father interchange was most
frequent. In a later study he (Haley, 1967a) investigated
the hypothesis that if a "family contains a problem
child that person will have a different frequency of
9Interchange with the parents than will the non-problem
child." This hypothesis was confirmed, indicating that
the parents speake before and after the identified patient
a great deal less than before and after his healthy
sibling. Although Haley does not consider these results
in terms of reinforcement contingencies, it would seem
that such conditions would lead to the child's learning
the general conception that what he has to contribute
to the family (and to the world) has less value than
what his sibling has to contribute. Both studies seem
to indicate that in the abnormal families, the disturbed
child is more Isolated from family interaction than his
own healthy sibling or the child in the non-disturbed
family. It would appear that the interactions in the
disturbed family, in effect, may be excluding the disturbed
child from an active association with the family group.
In these two studies the family was present as a
group and there was a conslderabel amount of non-verbal
communication which could not be taken into consideration.
Haley (1967b) attempted to elliminate the uncontrolled
non-verbal sources of communication by seperating family
triads in individual rooms. This experimental situation
allowed family members to talk in pairs through a
telephone-like apparatus. In this study, the hypothesis
10
that the normal group of families would participate more
equally in their activity together than the abnormal
group was not confirmed. In interpretting the results
of this study it is difficult to asses the influence
of the artificial experimental situation on the families'
typical communication patterns.
Murrell and Stachowiak (1966) found that the pattern
of verbal interaction in both disturbed and normal families
were conslstant in the four tasks used in their experi-
memt and over a period of time. These authors had
thought on the basis of Haley's (1964) earlier research
and because of their own theoretical conceptions (Murrell
& Stachowiak, 1965) that there would be a greater degree
of "rigidity” or organization in their clinic (disturbed)
families. However, they found that their normal family
groups demonstrated a significantly greater degree of
organization (rigidity) in their interactions than did
the disturbed families. The authors explained these
results by noting that in the non-clinic families the
mothers held a central power position and were thus
able to control and limit their families' interactions.
They propose that this situation had positive conse-
quences for adaptation which were missing in the clinic
families in which they found a "power vacuum." This
11
explanation, although consistent with their data, seems
to represent a post hoc explanation which does not recon-
cile the differences between theory, earlier findings
and their own data.
Ferreira and Winter (1966) report that abnormal
families when contrasted with normal ones differed on
three variables related to family decision making. They
found that when the families contained a child diagnosed
as abnormal it had less "spontaneous agreement," took
longer to make decisions and derived less individual ful-
fillment from family decisions. They set up a test-retest
situation using the same families six months later to
test the stability and validity of these variables.
There were no changes evident for the means of any of
the groups on the three variables studied over this period
of time. This study would appear to offer support for
the stability of family interaction variables as well as
for the differences in patterns of communication in normal
and abnormal groups. The above studies were concerned
with the patterns of verbal communication within differ-
ent groups of families.
Bermann (1967) , reports on a methodological depart-
ure from the previous studies that have been reviewed.
He used an experimental button pushing task to study
family Interaction. He found that the control families
12
were able to shift adaptively their usual mode of family
decision making, while In the reading problem families,
their unsuccessful method of decision making became
entrenched and rigid. This would seem to lend support
to Murrell and Stachowiak ( 1965 ) in their suggestion
that patterns of Interaction in families with a dis-
turbed child tend to be more rigid than in families
without such a child. In comparing the performance of
the family dyads, he found that in the reading problem
families, the mother-father dyads did the poorest while
in the control families, this dyad did the best. This
finding may be taken as offering support for the notion
that in addition to the disturbance in the problem child,
there is also a disturbance between the parental dyad
in such families. Typically, the child's disturbance
has been seen as necessary to maintain the family equil-
ibrium in spite of lntra-parental conflicts,
d) METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
The studies cited above confirm the basic assumpt-
ions that* (1) interactions within families do follow
an organized, repetitive pattern, (2) the patterns are
different in families with emotionally disturbed children
(Haley, 1964* Murrell & Stachowiak, 1966; Ferreira &
13
Winter, 1966 ) , and ( 3 ) the disturbed child is dealt with
differently from a non-disturbed child (Haley, 1967a).
In addition to this, it would appear that the parental
interaction in families with a disturbed child is less
effective and, perhaps, more disturbed than that dyad
in families without a disturbed child (Bermann, 1967)
.
At the present time, we do not have a clear under-
standing of the specific differences in the patterns
of interaction in these families which would result in
a child manifesting signs of emotional disturbance.
Perhaps the reason for this is that research efforts
are still in a neonatal stage. Bermann (1966, 1967)
,
in tracing the history of such research points out that
many of the initial investigations grew out of intensive
clinical studies which were directed towards the testing
of general hypotheses rather than specific ones. This
clinical methodology can be seen reflected in the research
design in which the family is brought together to discuss
something and then observations are made in this therapy-
like situation.
Bermann' s (1967) research, as well as several other
studies (Cl ernes & Terrill, 1968 ; Bean & Kerckhoff
,
1969 ;
Ravich, 1969 ) in which experimental or simulation tech-
niques have been used to study family interactional
processes, suggest that these methods may have several
14
potential advantages over the more naturalistic paradigm
(Haley, 1964; Murrell & Stachowiak, 1966; Ferreira &
Winter, 1966). Simulation techniques lend themselves
to greater standardization and control in the experimental
situation. They avoid problems associated with the
accuracy of informants' statements, as well as subjects'
inhibition or censorship of their expressive behavior
because of the presence of an observer. The simulation
technique or experimental game is highly structured and
involves the subject in a simplified interpersonal sit-
uation which is seen as reflecting a conflict such as
that between cooperation and competition. Each family
group is, therefore, confronted with a similar task and
their responses would seem to reflect the way that they
would typically resolve the interpersonal conflict which
is embodied in the game.
In the present study, the prisoner's dilemma game
(Rapoport & Orwant, 1962), a simulation technique, was
used with the intent of exploring its value in the study
of family dynamics, as well as to further understand
differences in the patterns of interaction of families
with children who are at different levels of adjustment.
The prisoner's dilemma game has the advantages of focusing
on the basic conflict of cooperation versus competition
as well as having had its parameters previously studied.
15
A further discussion of the prisoner's dilemma game will
be presented in a later section of this paper.
In most of the research on family process, the
experimental group has been taken from a clinic popula-
tion and has been considered abnormal. The control
group has been a matched non-clinic sample. The criteria
for abnormality or emotional disturbance has thus been
whether or not a particular family has referred itself
or been referred for treatment.
This procedure does not allow us to deal with clearly
defined independent variables. Does the fact that a
family refers its child to a clinical setting define
this child as emotionally disturbed? There are certainly
many factors which enter into the phenomena of referring
someone to a mental health setting which have little
to do with the level of emotional adjustment. Such select-
ion procedures lead to highly heterogeneous samples which
are contaminated by uncontrolled variables. In addition,
this procedure would appear to be naive in that the
distinction between clinic versus non-clinic or normal
versus abnormal family is an extremely gross classification
scheme which does not allow us to draw finer quantitative
and qualitative distinctions between the subjects within
the various groups.
16
A specific factor which may contaminate data
obtained from populations defined in this way is that
family members who have been accepted by a clinical
setting and asked to participate in research there
may consequently perceive themselves as "sick" and have
a variety of non-specific reactions based on this self-
perception. There would be no way to tell whether the
obtained differences were due to the underlying system
of interactions which brought the family to a place
where they could obtain help or to a secondary process
of redefinition due to their new status.
It would seem more fruitful to select the sample
by defining a quality which would be associated with
emotional disturbance in childhood and then to establish
groups that varied quantitatively along this dimension.
Using such a dimension would not only provide clearly
delineated groups, but the Independent variable would
then be minimally contaminated by uncontrolled and
extraneous variables. In addition, defining groups
along such a dimension should enable one to look at the
relationship between the individual characteristic
operationally defined by this measure and the intra-
familial interaction process that is thought to be related
to this characteristic.
There are different assumptions involved in the two
17
methods of selecting subjects. In classifying people
di chotomously as "abnormal" or "normal," the emphasis
is on abnormality, involving the assumption that there
are factors present in the abnormal group which are absent
in the normal group. This classification scheme is clearly
related to a disease model of psychological difficulties.
The alternative selection procedure would imply that
the concept of adjustment is not dichotomous, but rather
a continuum, and that different factors or processes
are associated with the different points along the
continuum. Good adjustment may not only be a result
of the absence of pathological processes, but may also
be related to the presence of factors which do not
exist in average or poor adjustment.
e) SELF-ESTEEM i THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE.
In the present study, families will be selected
according to their children's level of self-esteem.
Self-esteem is centrally associated with the concept
of emotional adjustment and, in turn, quite relevant
to the behavioral manifestations of emotional disturbance
in childhood. Recent research (Coopersmith,1959# 196??
Rosenberg, 1965) has pointed out the utility of using
the concept of self-esteem in research on personality
18
development and functioning. This concept is typically
seen as referring to an individual's personal satisfaction
with his life, the effectiveness of his functioning,
and an evaluative attitude of approval or disapproval
that an individual holds toward himself. Such evaluative
attitudes would seem to indicate "the extent to which
the individual believes himself to be capable, significant
and worthy" ( Coopersmith, 196?).
In the present study the operational definition
of self-esteem will be the measure developed by Cooper-
smith (1959* 1967)« Coopersmith (1967) reported that
after a three year interval (N=* 56 ) the reliability of
this measure was .70. He concludes that for children
(ages 8 through 10), self-esteem has become a fairly
stable factor. To the degree that this factor is thought
to have motivational and behavioral consequences, it
would then appear to be a fairly good predictor of
future adjustment, Coopersmith (personal communication,
1969 ) reports that further research with this measure
has indicated that it is consistently reliable with male
and female subjects through college age.
The Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967 ) Is
clearly related to many aspects of adjustment in child-
hood. To summarize the findings, low levels of self-
esteem are signlficantly related tot poor academic
19
performance, poor social relations, less assertiveness
and independence in peer relations, greater sensitivity
to criticism, higher levels of anxiety, and these children
are perceived by their mothers as being more destructive
and as having "marked frequent problems." In addition,
medium self-esteem children tend to be midway between
the high and low self-esteem children on many of these
measures.
f) THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAMEi THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE.
The prisoner's dilemma game is a fairly complex
interactional task that results in eleven dependent
measures. Although it has received considerable atten-
tion in the literature, it will be discussed in detail.
The P.D, game (Rapoport & Orwant, 1962) is a two-
person, mixed-motive, non-zero sum game. Gallo and McClintock
(I965) define a game as "a situation in which the persons
involved are attempting to attain some goal(s) and in
which their success or failure is dependent not only on
their strategy but also on the strategy choices of the
other individual(s) in the situation." Mixed motive
refers to the idea that the goals of the players are
partially coincidental and partially in conflict. The
P.D. game (Oskamp & Perlman, 1965 ) I s called a non-zero
20
sum game because the payoffs of the two players do not
sum to zero i "both may win on any given trial, or both
may lose, or one may win and the other lose." This is
in contrast to a zero sum game such as chess or dice.
Gallo and McClintock (1965) believe that one reason
that the prisoner's dilemma (P.D.) game has enjoyed con-
siderable popularity in research is that it "answers
the long-felt need for a well controlled interaction
situation with an easily quantifiable and unambiguous
dependent variable, the number of cooperative responses
made by each subject." They also point out that another
reason that interest has developed in the P.D. game
is that simulation has been recognized as an important
means of studying human behavior. Clemes and Terrill
(1968) strongly agree with the use of games in research
on human behavior. They suggest that much "of human
interaction has the characteristics of a game with pre-
dictable moves and definite, if not always obvious, out-
comes. "
In a pilot study it was found that family members
had little difficulty in learning to play this game.
The mean ages of the ten children that participated in
this study was 11*3 years; the range was from 9 to 15
years. The game appears to be quite simple as well as
having a great deal of inherent interest for the
21
participants. The concepts that have been used to describe
behavior on the P.D. game are trust, cooperation, com-
petition and defection. These concepts seem to have
a great deal of relevance for interpersonal and especially
intrafamilial behavior.
The P.D, two-person game is represented by the follow-
ing payoff matrix (Rapoport & Orwant, 1962).
B
1
B
2
A
1 (Xlt X: ) (x2 > x3 )
a2 (x3 , x2 ) (x4 . X4 )
Each X represents a specific payoff value. The first
value in each cell is player "A's" payoff, the second
is player "B's," The payoff matrix in the P.D, game
is subject to and defined by the following conditions!
1. 2X1 X2 + Xj 2X4
2. Xj X4
3. x3
x2
4. X4 X2
The actual numerical values in the matrix can be varied
and in fact are important independent variables in the
game. The following is a common numerical payoff matrix
used (Gallo & McClintock, 1965) in studies with the P.D.
»
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Ai (+5. +5) (-4, +6 )
a2 (+6 , -4) (-3 , - 3 )
On each trial of the game each player has a choice
between position 1 and position 2. The principle
feature of this type of game is that for both players
strategy 2 dominates over strategy 1. Gallo and
McCllntock (1965) describe the situation as follows:
MPlayer A realizes that his A2 strategy will give him
a larger payoff regardless of which strategy player B
selects. Similarly, player B realizes that his B2
strategy dominates his strategy. Each player
therefore selects his second strategy, which places
them in the A2B2 cell and results in a payoff of (- 3 )
for each player." This has been described as the only
rational solution to the game when we assume that each
player wants to do the best for himself.
It may be expected that over a series of trials
a tacit agreement would develop between the players so
that they would remain in the A^B^ cell. However, such
an agreement is quite unstable because any unilateral
defection from this agreement will for that trial
23
increase the payoff of the player who defected. Because
of these features Deutsch (1968, i960) believes that
the essential psychological feature of the P.D. game
is that there is no possibility for rational individual
behavior unless the conditions of mutual trust exist.
He believes (Deutsch, 1958) that ifi
Heach player chooses to obtain either maximum
gain or minimum loss for himself, each will
lose. But it makes no sense to choose the
other alternative, which would result in
maximum loss, unless one can trust the other
player. If one can not trust, it is of course
safer to chose so as to suffer minimum rather
than maximum loss, but it is even better not
to play the game. If one can not trust there
may be no reasonable alternative except to
choose the lesser of two evils and/or attempt
to develop the conditions which will permit
mutual trust."
Behavior on the P.D. game is thought to be a
function of personality factors which may be induced
by giving subjects motivational sets (expectations) or
by utilizing sets inherent in the Individual (Deutsch,
1958, I960 1 McClintock, 1965). In addition to these
subject variables, there is a second group of factors
which influence a subject's performance on the game,
which may be called situational variables because they
involve manipulations of the experimental situation.
The overall results of studies with the P.D. game
(Gallo & McClintock, 1965 1 Oskamp & Perlman, 1965)
24
have indicated that the percentage of cooperative or
trusting responses obtained tends to be Just below 50%
and to decrease over a series of trials. Rapoprt and
Chammah (1965) found an initial decrement in their
subjects' level of cooperation and a shift toward greater
cooperation between the twentieth and thirtieth trial.
They found that their subjects' reached an asymptote
of 50% cooperation at approximately the fiftieth trial.
The regular quadratic nature of the distribution of
cooperative responses would indicate that one should
utilize a sufficient number of trials to account for
this phenomena.
The most frequent as well as the most natural way
of dealing with this data is to look at the total
relative frequency of the cooperative responses for
the groups which are being studied (Rapoport & Orwant,
1962). However, because this index is strongly influenced
by the interaction effects of the paired players (Rapoport
& Chammah, 1965 ) , it would be difficult to state whether
the characteristic was inherent in the individuals
that made up the different groups or in the way these
individuals interact. Therefore the overall measure
of the frequency of cooperative response (C) is a
poor measure of individual propensity.
25
Rapoport and Chammah (19$5) developed a series
of indices of performance on the P,D. game which were
less influenced by statistical Interaction effects.
That is, the measures for each player were correlated
less than the two subjects' C. They believe that
these measures are more suitable indicators of personal
propensities. Our discussion of these measures follows
Rapoport and Chammah (1965). The gross index of cooperative
response is a simple frequency count, while the following
Indices are measures of the subject's probability of
responding cooperatively after certain specified events
have occurred. Not only are these indices less correl-
ated with each /Other, but they also allow us to look
at more specific determinants of a subject's propensity
to respond cooperatively. The probability indices
would seem to be informative analoglues of the interactional
strategies within family groups.
The following payoff matrix may be a helpful
refrence for the dlscusssion of the probability Indices
s
(+5* +5)
C, C C, D
(-10
,
+10 )
D, D
A,
2
D, C
(+10
,
-10 ) (-5. -5)
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fhe first letter end value in each cell represents player
A's response and payoff, the second letter and value
in each cell represents player B's. C represents a
cooperative choice, while D represents a non-cooperative
choice.
A is the probability that the subject responds
cooperatively following the other subject's cooperative
response on the preceeding trial. This can be thought
of as the propensity to respond cooperatively to the
other's cooperative choice. It would perhaps Indicate
an attempt to establish a mutually cooperative arrangement
with theother player or a willingness to cooperate as
long as the other continues to respond similarly.
B is the probability that the subject responds
cooperatively followitn his own cooperative response
on the preceeding trial. It is the subject's propensity
to continue to respond cooperatively or to persist in
the cooperative response.
E is similar to this and is defined as the probability
that the subject responds non-cooperatively followint
his own non-cooperative response on the preceeding trial.
It is his propensity to continue or persist in the non-
cooperative response.
P is the probability that the subject responds
27
cooperatively following the other subject's non-coop-
erative response on the preceeding trial. A low
probability may be thought of as representing a vengeful
attitude, while a high probability may indicate an attempt
by the subject to convert the other player to a more
cooperative agreement,
X is the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial in which both he and
the other player chose cooperatively! following a trial
in which they each received an equal, positive payoff
(+5 » +5 )» According to Rapoport and Chammah (1965) this
measure indicates "a willingness to continue the tacit
collusion of mutual cooperation implied by definition
to have been achieved on the previous trial. This will-
ingness is associated with a willingness to resist the
temptation to defect which is always present.
Y is the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial in which he responded
cooperatively and the other subject responded non-
cooperatively i following a trial in which he was the
lone cooperator. He would therefore receive the
largest negative payoff (-10) which has been called the
"sucker's" payoff, while the player who defected receives
the largest positive payoff (+10) which has been called
the "temptation" • Y has been thought to indicate a
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"willingness to persist in cooperating even though one
has been betrayed. It therefore suggests either forgive-
ness or martyrdom, or a strong faith in teaching by
example, or perhaps stupidity, depending on the ethical
values of whoever evaluates this behavior."
Z is the probability that a subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial in which he defected
and the other player responded cooperatively; following
a trial on which he received the bonus or "temptation"
payoff (+10), while the other player received the"sucker 's"
payoff (-10). This has been seen as indicating a "willing-
ness to stop defecting in response to the other's cooper-
ative choice. It may indicate repentence or responsive-
ness." If we view the P.D. game as a learning situation,
this response tendency would be an extremely difficult
choice in that the subject would have been highly rewarded
for his previous non-cooperative response and would,
therefore, be more likely to again respond non-cooperatively.
Z would seem to indicate whether the subject views
the game in terms of gaining maximal individual gain,
in which case Z will be low and the subject will act
in terms of the reinforcement contingencies , or whether
he considers the other player's gain as well as his own,
in which case Z will be high and the subject will be able
to resist the temptation of the bonus payoff.
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W is the probability that a subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial on which both he and
the other player responded non-cooperativelyj following
a trial on which they each received equal negative payoffs
(-5 * - 5 ). This is thought of as indicating a "willingness
to try cooperating as a way to break out of a mutually
defecting (DD) trap. Clearly this action is justifiable
only if a certain amount of trust in the responsiveness
of the other exists in the initiator of cooperation.
Hence, W suggests trust. " The subject who contemplates
responding cooperatively after both subjects have responded
non-cooperatively is probably aware that if the other
subject is not willing to respond cooperatively then
he will receive the "sucker's" payoff (-10), while the
non-cooperative subject receives the bonus payoff (+10).
The gross cooperative frequency (C) must be a result
of any combination of these propensities. For example,
it may be a result of a high probability of B, the subject's
persistence in the cooperative response, with low
probabilities in the other probability measures. It
is, therefore, Important to note that these probability
measures are components of the gross relative frequency
of cooperation (C) and also allow us to differentiate
more specific determinants of a subject's propensity
to respond cooperatively. They would, therefore, appear
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to be potentially more useful measures.
One of the interesting aspects of the P,D. game
is that the subjects quickly become aware that their
responses influence the responses of the other player,
A response or a series of responses may be thought of
as an attempt at communication or negotiation. This
would be especially important when there is no other
means of communication allowed in the game. For example,
take measure Wi if a subject was attempting to cooperate
as a way out of the DD trap, he would probably recognize
that in order for his intentions to be clear and for
the other subject to have the time necessary to change
his response, he would have to respond cooperatively
for at least two trials. When we look at these probability
indices over a relatively long period of trials, they
would appear to be good indicators of the dynamic inter-
actional processes that exist in the P.D. game.
As stated earlier (Deutsch, 1958) , trust is thought
to be one of the central psychological attributes involved
in interpretations of the P,D, game. Rapoport and Chammah
(1965) succinctly state that "the choice in the P.D. game
appears to be the choice between competing and cooperating,
between conflict and conflict resolution, between trust
and suspicion and between loyalty and betrayal." If
we accept the assumption that game behavior is indicative
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of or reveals non-game, real life behavior and attitudes,
then It would seem that the P.D. game can be seen as
an excellent methodology for studying patterns of inter-
action within families in order to learn whether different
patterns of interaction are related to attributes of
individual family members such as the child’s level of
adjustment.
Nine ways in which the data obtained from the P.D.
game can be viewed have been discussed. The question
arises of how differences between groups that emerge
on some of the measures and not others will be dealt
with. Most research with the P.D, game (for example:
Bean & Kerckhoff, 1969; Deutsch, I960; Gallo & McClintock,
1965 ) has only used the measure of total relative
frequency of cooperative response (C) and have, there-
fore, not had to come to terms with this inferential
problem.
Eapoport and Chammah (19&5) presenting this
alternative method of dealing with the data obtained
from the P.D. game did so in order to explore finer
differences in subjects' individual propensities of
responding cooperatively. Because of the nature of
their study, they also did not have to come to terras
with the inferential problem that is involved in
obtaining several indices of the same behavior.
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This problem would seem to go beyond the present
methodology and appears rather to be one which touches
the underlying assumptions of the philosophy of science.
Breger (1969)1 in discussing several issues in the
philosophy of science as they apply to contemporary
psychology, points out the distinction between two
separate but intertwined models of science which are the
context of discovery and the context of verification.
The latter is the model for a hypothesis testing exper-
iment in which we are interested in confirming a
specific assumption about the effects of a particular
variable on behavior. However, before this stage of
hypothesis verification is arrived at, there would have
to be in existance not only a specific theory from which
the hypotheses were derived, but also a valid method
which may be thought of as one of the substructures of
the theory.
It is quite obvious that family theory has not
reached this stage of development either in terms of
its theory or method. The present study may be viewed,
in Breger' s (1969) terms, as being in the context of
discovery. It is an empirical, exploratory study which
will hopefully lead to additional methodological know-
ledge as well as more specific hypotheses about the
relationship between the intrafamllial interactional
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process and different levels of adjustment In children.
The measurement technique that was used in this
study is relatively new and must be viewed in an
exploratory way. An analogy from the field of physiology
appears to be somewhat appropriate. In studying a
particular sample of tissue we may not know which of
several dyes would Illuminate that sample best; we would,
therefore, use many dyes to see what aspects of the
structure each illuminates. The indices that have been
discussed are thought of as similar to the dyes used in
physiology in that each may illuminate a different aspect
of the structure of the relationships within the family.
g) THE PRESENT STUDY.
The purpose of the present study was to explore
the relationship between current interactional behavior
within a child's family and his (her) level of self-
esteem. Self-esteem, as measured by the Self-Esteem
Inventory (Coopersmith, 1 967 ), is of interest because
of its strong conceptual and empirical relationship to
adjustment in childhood. On a more general level this
study was thought of as a demonstration that a child's
level of adjustment is related to the current Interaction
patterns in his family (Jakson, 1965? Ross, 1964;
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Handel, 1965)
,
In the present study, in contrast to previous
investigations of current family interaction patterns,
rather than using an abnormal sample drawn from a
clinic population and a normal (non-clinic) sample,
the sample was drawn from a regular school setting.
We would, therefore, expect to be able to establish the
relationship between the level of a child's self-esteem
and family interactions more clearly than if more
heterogeneous and less well defined groups were used.
The prisoner's dilemma game has been thought of
(Deutsch, 1958 ; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965) as an
experimental analogue of a conflict between the following
psychological states t trust and mistrust, cooperation
and competition, conflict resolution and conflict, and
loyalty and betrayal. It would seem unnecessary to
document the point that most clinically oriented
theorists would suggest that the family relationships
of poorly adjusted children would be described by the
second state of each of the above word pairs. Conversely,
(and perhaps naively,) the interactions in families
with well adjusted children have been described as
having the following characteristics* trust, coopera-
tion, ability to resolve conflict and loyalty.
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The basic assumption In using a simulation
technique such as the prisoner's dilemma game, is
that behavior In the game Is analogous to behavior
of the players In their real life situations. We
would, therefore, expect that the members of the low
self-esteem children's families to be less cooperative
in their choices on the prisoner's dilemma game than
will the members of the medium and high self-esteem
children's families. This would reflect the less
satisfactory, less cooperative and less trusting rela-
tionships within the families of the low self-esteem
children.
Several indices of cooperation that can be derived
from the P.D. game have been discussed. The first set
of measures are based on the total relative frequency
of cooperative response by the subject. The second
set of measures were based on specific probability meas-
ures. In addition to this, one can ask whether the
members of one group, for example the low self-esteem
children's families, become less likely to respond
cooperatively over time than do the members of the
medium and high self-esteem children's families. These
three approaches to the question of differences in the
rates of cooperation in the families of high, medium
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and low self-esteem children are the basis of the
first three hypotheses.
Most family theorists seem to agree that the
emotionally disturbed child's problems are a function
of the parents scapegoating him. It was expected that
there would be less cooperation and greater conflict
in the interactions between the parents in the families
of the low self-esteem children as opposed to the
parental Interactions in the families of the medium
and high self-esteem children. This relationship was
tested in the fourth hypothesis.
Heatherington and Frankie (1967) point out that
there is considerable evidence ’’indicating that identi-
fication and appropriate sex-role typing are facilitated
for both sex children by warmth In the same sex parent.”
It would seem that positive identification and sex-role
typing are involved in the development of high levels
of self-esteem and self acceptance. We would therefore
expect that in the members of the high self-esteem
families, the interactions between the child and the
same sex parent would be more cooperative and less
likely to maintain conflict than in those Interactions
in the medium and low self-esteem children's families.
This relationship will be tested in the fifth hypothesis.
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Previous research which used dichotomous groupings,
such as abnormal and normal, has not attempted to use
a medium group. Coopersmlth (1967) was not explicit
in his rational for using a medium self-esteem group.
There is a serious lack of consideration in the
literature of the characteristics of medium self-esteem
families as well as differences between this group and
high or low self-esteem families. In this study the
medium self-esteem group was included inorder to
investigate empirically differences between it and the
high and low self-esteem groups.
h) HYPOTHESES.
In summary the present research will test the
following specific hypotheses.
1. The members of the families of the low self-
esteem children will be less cooperative and will have
a greater incidence of the mutually non-cooperative
response than will the members of the medium and high
self-esteem children's families.
*
2. Members of the families of the low self-
esteem children will be characterized by a lower
probability of responding cooperatively, or a higher
probability of responding non-cooperatively , than will
members of families of medium and high self-esteem
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children.
3. As the prisoner’s dilemma game proceeds over
fifty trials the probability that the members of the
medium and high self-esteem children's families will
respond cooperatively, will increase, while that of the
members of the low self-esteem children's families
will decrease,
4, In the interactions between the parents of the
low self-esteem children there will be lower probabilities
of responding cooperatively andlower probabilities of
responses that would resolve conflict or increase
cooperation than in the interactions of the parents
of the medium and high self-esteem children.
5* a) The interactions between the fathers and
sons of the high self-esteem families will be charact-
erized by greater probabilities of cooperative responses
and higher probabilities of responses that would
reduce conflict than in the interactions between
the medium and low self-esteem boys and their fathers.
b) The interactions between the mothers and
daughters of the high self-esteem families will be
characterized by greater probabilities of cooperative
responses and highher probabilities of responses that
would reduce conflict than in the interactions between
the medium and low self-esteem girls and their mothers.
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CHAPTER II
. METHOD
Subjects.
Sixty, three-member family groups participated
in this study. Each "family” consisted of two parents
and one child who was not an only child. All of the
children were in the seventh grade of a suburban school
district in the New York metropolitan area. The community
that the families lived in was middle to upper middle
class. The sample was extremely homogeneous on all of
the demographic indices examined. This demographic
Information is summarized in Table 1. The "father's
occupation index" is based on Holllngshead and Redlich's
(1968) presentation! the criteria used can be found in
Appendix A.
The families who participated in this study were
selected from a sample of families of high, medium and
low self-esteem children. The upper quartlle, middle
half of the interquartile range and lowest quartlle, of
the Self-Esteem Inventory, were computed separately for
the male and female children. The high, medium and low
Table 1» Demographic Information For Sample
HIGH MEDIUM LOtf
S-E S-E S-E
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Child's level
of S-E 52.0 49.0 41.5 42.1 32.4 28.0
Child's Age 12.4 12.9 12.5 12.6 12.8 12.6
Child's IQ 120 115 120 114 119 119
Mother's
Age 40 39 39 39 41 39
Father '
s
Age 44 42 42 42 44 42
Number of
Siblings 1.9 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.6
Number of
Years Married 18 18 17 18 17 18
Mother's
Education
In Years 14 13 15 15 13 15
Father's
Education
In Years 16 15 16 16 14 16
Father's
Occupational
Index * 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.2
% Mothers
Employed
Part Time 10 10 0 50 10 20
family
Income In
Thousands
i $10 - 15
t $15 - 20
% above $20
30
20
50
30
30
40
0
30
70
10
50
40
30
20
50
30
20
50
* This socioeconomic index has five levels, with 1"
the highest and "5" the lowest.
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self-esteem groups were defined by the upper, middle
and lowest quartile of the Self-Esteem Inventory.
In evaluating the differences between the scores
of the high, medium and low self-esteem (S-E) groups,
non-parametric statistics were used because Self-Esteem
Inventory scores can be viewed as having the character-
istics of ordinal measurement. A. Kruskal-Wallace, One-
Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks (McNemar, 1962) was
performed to determine If these groups were significantly
different on this measure. The results of this analysis
(H = 464.4) indicated that the probability of obtaining
these scores from the same population Is .001. It
would, therefore, appear that the high, medium and low
S-E groups were drawn from different populations. There
were no significant sex differences within the S-E groups.
Table A in Appendix A shows the percent of subjects
in each S-E group who checked "like me" for the statements
on the Self-Esteem Inventory. These percentages were
based on a sample of twenty-five subjects in each cell.
The six, S-E by sex, groups were compared on eleven
demographic variables in addition to S-E. It is important
to note that on all but one the groups were extremely
homogeneous. The one demographic variable on which the
groups did differ slgnificantly was the "percent of mothers
employed part time." Chi 2 * 10.80 (df = 5) » which indicated
that the difference between the "percentage of mothers
employed part time" was significant (p .05). This
difference would appear to be due to the 50% of the
mothers of the medium S-E girls working while only 10#
of the other subjects' mothers were employed part time.
Apparatus and Materials.
The prisoner's dilemma game used In this study Is
a modification of the one described by Oskamp and Perlman
(1965). There were two subject panels which were connected
to a control panel which was operated by the experimenter.
Each subject panel was a white, 7i" X 7" X 2", aluminum
box which had four differently colored feedback lights
mounted In a 4" X 4" square. Directly below each feedback
light was a color coded indication of the payoff for
each subject for that cell of the payoff matrix. For
example, beneath the light In the upper left hand
corner of the square written on green plastic tape was
"green wins 5" and in red plastic tape "red wins 5«
"
At the bottom and center of each subject's panel, mounted
2" apart, were two push button switches which were used
by the subjects to make either a cooperative or a non-
cooperative response. These buttons were labelled "1”
and "2" in either green or red plastic tape. Below the
response buttons each panel was labelled in the corresponding
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color either "green" or "red."
The two subject panels were connected to the control
panel, which was operated by E. Lights on this panel
Indicated whether the subjects had chosen the "1" or
"2" response. There were a series of switches on this
panel which allowed E to activate the appropriate feed-
back lights on the S's panels as well as on the control
panel. A partition was set up which obscured the subject's
view of each other as well as their view of the control
panel
.
The following payoff matrix was used in this study.
The first value in each cell represents the red player's
payoff and the second value represents the green player's
payoff. The particular values in the payoff matrix were
chosen so as to maximize clarity to the S's. It was
thought that a symetrical payoff matrix with clear, easily
manipulated differences would facilitate the S's (especially
the children's) understanding of the utilities involved in
the P.D. game.
Green Player
1 2
1 (+5 . +5 ) (-10 , +10 )
Red Player
2 (+10 , -10 ) (-5 . -5 )
The child’s level of self-esteem (S-E) was determined
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by the Self-Esteem Inventory (S.E.I.) described by Cooper-
smith (1967). The S.E.I.
,
which can be found in Appendix A.
is a series of statements that the subject checks as to
whether it is "like me" or "not like me." The scoring
procedure that was used for the S.E.I. was based on
the criteria supplied by Coopersmith in which the
total number of right answers are summed to form a self-
esteem score. Blanks, double checks and checks on the
midline were scored as if wrong.
Summary of P.D. Game Scoring Procedure.
The data obtained from the P.D. game was initially
in the format of a game protocol! fifty pairs of either
cooperative or non-cooperative responses. The frequency
measures used to analyze this data were the absolute
relative frequency of cooperative choice (C), the per-
centage of frequency of mutually cooperative choice (CC)
and the percentage or frequency of mutually non-cooper-
ative choice (DD). The latter two are indices of the
level of cooperation within the dyad.
In addition to these frequency measures, the follow-
ing probability indices were obtained from the P.D. game.
1. A, the probability that the subject responds
cooperatively following the other player's
cooperative response on the preceeding trial.
2. B, the probability that the subject responds
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cooperatively following his own cooperative
response on the preceeding trial i his persistence
in the cooperative response.
3. E, the probability that the subject responds
non-cooperatively following his own non-cooper-
ative response on the preceeding trial* his
persistence in the non-cooperative response.
4. F t the probability that the subject responds
cooperatively following the other player's non-
cooperative response on the preceeding trial.
5. X, the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial on which both
he and the other player responded cooperatively.
6. Y» the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial on which he
responded cooperatively and the other player
responded non-cooperatively.
7. Z, the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial on which he
responded non-cooperatively and the other player
responded cooperatively.
8. W p the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial on which both
he and the other player responded non-cooperatively.
The calculations involved in scoring these probability
measures are fairly tedious. When this research was
undertaken there were no computer programs available for
scoring these measures. Consequently , it was necessary to
develop a series of Fortran programs to do this job.
These programs are available from the author.
Procedure.
Obtaining the Sample* The cooperating school district
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had requested that permission from the parents be
obtained before the Self-Es teen Inventory was administered
to their children. Three days before the inventory was
to be administered, a letter which partially explained
the purpose of the study and requested the parents
'
permission to allow their child's participation, was
given to students in all seventh grade classes by teachers
from the social studies department, a copy of this letter
is Included in Appendix A. On the day that the inventory
was to be administered to those students who returned
a permission slip, there was a high rate of absenteeism
due to the day of mourning for Dwight Eisenhower. As
a result of this, only 60$ of the seventh grade students
were available for the preliminary testing.
A high, medium, and low S-E group was obtained for
both the male and female S's as previously described.
A letter was then sent to the parents of these students
requesting their further cooperation and briefly explaining
the nature of the study. A copy of this letter is included
in Appendix A.
A week after these letters were mailed to the potential
participants, the E called the families and attempted
to arrange a suitable time. It had been decided that
ten families in each cell would be adequate, and families
were contacted until the required number agreed to
4?
participate. The order in which the families were
contacted was alphabetical. When a family agreed to
participate, an appointment was set up, usually in the
evening or on a weekend afternoon. All necessary pre-
cautions were taken so that the E did not know what group
the family was in until the conclusion of the experiment.
All S's were seen in their own home.
Sixty-four percent of the families contacted by
phone agreed to participate in this study. The number
of families contacted and the percentage participating
can be found in Table in Appendix A, The number of
families that agreed to participate was relatively high.
Experimental Procedure.
The order in which the family dyads would play the
P.D, game had been randomized before the E arrived at
the subjects* home. After setting up the equipment,
most typically in the kitchen or diningroom, the first
dyad was asked to be seated and the following instruct-
ions were then read. These instructions are a modified
version of those presented by Rapoport and Chammah (1965)*
You will be playing a game using these two boxes.
Let me explain to you how to play. The idea of
this game is to win as many points for yourself
as possible. . .it does not matter how many points
the person who you are playing with gets... the
winner is the person who ends up with the most
points.
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As I explain the game you will see that the number
of points that you get depends on what both you
and the person that you are playing with does. This
is how it works.
One of you will be the red player and one the green
player. (E points out how each S panel is marked
"red player" and "green player"). Why don't you
be "green. " On each trial of the game you will
each make one of two choices by pushing either one
of these two buttons. If you both push the first
button (E asks S's to push this button), then this
light comes on and as you can see (points to the
points indicated beneath the light), you will both
win 5 points. If the red player chooses the first
button and the green player chooses the second
button, then the green player wins 10 and the red
player loses 10. If the red player chooses the
second button and the green player chooses the first
button, then green loses 10 and red wins 10.
I am going to give you a sheet of paper on which
you can record your wins and losses; we will total
them up after each 10 trials. I will read off,
after each trial, the number of points each one
of you has won or lost. I would like you to write
it in the appropriate column.
Remember, it is important to try and get as many
points as you can to win. Once the game starts
you cannot talk to each other. Are there any quest-
ions? Let's try It 5 times to see if everything
is clear.
After the five practice trials any misunderstandings
were clarified and the actual 50-trial game was begun.
After each block of ten trials the game was stopped so
that the players could tally their scores. Any S's
who had difficulty with the arithmetic were helped by
E.
After the first pair of players had completed their
game, one person was asked to leave and the third family
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member was seated. The instructions and procedure were
repeated. For the third game, the Instructions were
not repeated unless there were questions about it. At
the conclusion of the third game, the E thanked the
family for participating and asked them not to discuss
the game with other friends who may yet be participating
in the study. It took approximately l| to 2 hours to
complete the experiment with each family.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The first two hypotheses predicted that In their
overall performance on the P.D. game, the members of
the low S—E families would be less cooperative and more
competitive than the members of the high and medium S-E
families. The first hypothesis, which utilized the
frequency measures (C, CC, DD)
,
was not confirmed. The
second hypothesis, which utilized the probability data,
also was not confirmed i however, in the latter case,
there were significant and unexpected sex differences
in the data for the high, medium, and low S-E children.
The third hypothesis predicted that there would
be differences in the temporal pattern of cooperative
behavior for the members of the three self-esteem groups,
with the members of the low S-E children's families
becoming progressively less cooperative while the
members of the medium and high S-E children's families
would become more likely to respond cooperatively as
the P.D. game proceeded over time. This hypothesis was
confirmed
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The fourth hypothesis predicted, that there would
be less cooperation and greater conflict In the Inter-
actions between the parents of the low S-E children
than In the interactions of the parents of the high and
medium S-E children. This hypothesis was also confirmed.
The fifth hypothesis predicted that there would
be a greater probability of responding cooperatively
in the interactions between the high S-E child and the
like sex parent than for the low S-E child and his (her)
same sex parent. This hypothesis was partially supported!
the data for the interaction of the boys and their
fathers conformed to the prediction while the data for
the girls and their mothers did not.
To review briefly, the following variables were
analyzed*
1. Self-Esteem * High, Medium, and Low.
2. Sex * This refers to the sex of the
child.
3. Role * This refers to the three
intrafamilial roles of mother,
father, and child.
4. Trial Block * In each game there are
five blocks of ten trials each.
5. Dyadic Partner * This refers to the
other player in the P.D. game* each
subject played the P.D. game twice,
once with each of the remaining family
members
•
6. Subjects * There are ten individuals
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at each level of self-esteem by sex
by role j this results In a total
sample of 180 subjects.
The detailed analyses of these variables will follow
the order of the proposed hypotheses.
A Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks
(McNemar, 1962) , a non-parametric statistic for the
mixed model design, was performed on the frequency
data used to evaluate hypothesis 1. The Frequency data
(C, CC, DD) were evaluated with non-parametric statistics
because they tend to be distributed binomially and the
correlation of subjects playing with each other tend
to be high.
The remaining hypotheses (2 through 5) were evaluated
with the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The Analysis
of Variance design that was used is a mixed esign (Chapter 8,
Myers, 1966) with three between and two within variables.
Each of the remaining hypotheses focus on different terms
in the analysis of variance. A seperate analysis of
variance was computed for each of the eight probability
measures described previously 1 the complete ANOVA
tables are included in Appendix B.
a) HYPOTHESIS 1.
Hypothesis 1 stated thati The members of the
families of low self-esteem children will be less
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cooperative and will have a greater incidence of the
mutually non-cooperative response than will the members
of the medium and high self-esteem families.
On the basis of chance or random play C would have
been expected to be 50.0 percent. The mean percentage
of cooperation (C) for the members of the high, medium,
and low S-E groups is 36.2, 35.6, and 33.3 respectively.
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks resulted
2in chi r = 0. This outcome Indicated that there was
no significant difference between the groups for measure
C.
Similar analyses of variance by ranks were performed
on the sex by role by dyadic partner by level of self-
esteem interactions. The mean levels of percent C and
2
the chi r for each is found in Table2. This analysis
compares differences in the way each family member played
with each of his two partners for the three S-E groups
of the male and female subjects.
The results of this analysis indicates that there
were no significant differences in the levels of cooper-
ation for the members of the three self-esteem groups.
Only one set of comparisons was significantly different
at the .05 level and that was in the girl-mother dyad.
Since twelve comparisons were made and only one was sig-
nificant, this raises the possibility that the observed
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Table 2« Mean Percentage of Cooperative Response and
Chi r For The Male andFemale Children and Their
Parents.
MEANS
ROLE DYADIC
PARTNER
HIGH
S-E
MEDIUM
S-E
LOW
S-E
CHI
2
r
Male Ss
MOTHER 00
•
tH0^ 43.6 37.2 1.4
CHILD
FATHER 29.6 40.6 25.8 -2.6
CHILD 40.0 40.8 43.8 -1.4
MOTHER
FATHER 3 ?.
6
26,4 33.0 -3.6
CHILD 36.6 34.2 25.8 -0.6
FATHER
Female
MOTHER
Ss
30.8 32.2 19.6 2.4
MOTHER 48.4 28.4 35.8 7.3*
CHILD
FATHER 39.6 38.0 32.0 -2.6
CHILD 42.0 39.6 38.4 0.2
MOTHER
FATHER 33.2 37.4 31.4 0.8
CHILD 33.2 38.0 32.0 -3.8
FATHER
Total
MOTHER 31.6
36.2
30.2
35.6
41.2
33.3
0.8
* P < .05
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significance was a result of chance. When the twelve
chi s were combined (McNemar, 1962) the resulting chi 2=
-1.7 (df * 24), which was not significant. Thus, the
observed significant difference between the high, medium,
and low S-E girls playing with their mothers was not
great enough to rule out the possibility that this
difference was a result of chance variability. The
result of this and the previous analysis would seem to
indicate that there was no difference in the frequency
of cooperative choice (C) for the members of the high,
medium, and low self-esteem families.
It was suggested that members of the high self-esteem
families would have more experiences of mutual satisfaction
and fewer experiences of mutual dissatisfaction. The
measures that reflect these tendencies in the P.D. game
are the percentage of mutual cooperation (CC) and the
percentage of mutual defection or non-cooperation (DD).
These frequencies are not based on the performance of
an individual subject but rather on the performance of
the dyad.
The mean percentages of mutual cooperation (CC)
for the high, medium, and low self-esteem groups weret
14.6, 13.6, and 13.8 respectively. For this analysis
chl
2
r « 12, which was not significant. The mean per-
centages of mutual defection (DD) for the high, medium,
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and low self-esteem groups wasi 42.3, 44.2, and 45.4.
2For this analysis the chi r - 0* this Indicates that
there was also no significant difference In the rate
of mutual defection for the three self-esteem groups.
If the subjects were playing randomly It would have been
expected that both CC and DD would be equal to 25 per-
cent. The data from these two measures as well as the
data from the C measure Indicated that all S's In the
study tended to play a fairly non-cooperative game.
The CC and DD data were analyzed further* the sex
by dyad (child-mother, child-father, mother-father) by
level of self-esteem Interaction was compared. The
2
mean percentages of CC and DD and the chi r for these
analyses are presented In Tables 3 and 4 below. These
analyses indicate that there was no significant difference
between the members of the high, medium, and low-self
esteem families in their frequency of mutually cooper-
ative (CC) or mutually non-cooperative (DD) responses.
b) HYPOTHESIS 2.
Hypothesis 2 stated that* Members of families of
low self-esteem children will be characterized by lower
probabilities of responding cooperatively and higher
probabilities of responding non-cooperatively than will
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Tab^e J: Mean percentage of mutually cooperative responses and
chi r for each dyad of the male and female subjects.
DYAD HIGH
S-E
MED
S-E
LOW
S-E
CHI2r
MALE SUBJECTS
child-mother 13.8 21.8 20.4 3.8
child-father 13.8 19.8 7.6 -Vo1
mother-father 13.8 8.2 7.2 -2.2
FEMALE SUBJECTS
child-mother 22.0 10. U 13.0 2.2
chiId- father 12.0 9.8 10.8 0.6
mother-father 12.
4
11.6 lU.O coo
1U .6 13.6TOTAL 13.8
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Table 4: Mean percentage of mutually non-cooperative responses
and chi2r for each dyad of the male and female subjects.
DYAD HIGH
S-E
MED
S-E
LOW
S-E
CHI2r
MALE SUBJECTS
child-mother 1+2.7 36.2 37.0 -2.8
child-father 47.4 1+5.2 56.6 -0.6
mother-father 1+5.8 53.0 55.2 -3.4
FEMALE SUBJECTS
child-mother 30.8 1+3.0 38.8 -2.6
child-father 1+0.6 44.8 47.8 0.8
mother-father 1+6.6 42.6 37.4 -3.7
TOTAL 1+2.3 44.1 45.4
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the members of families of medium and high self-esteem
children. Table 5 summarizes the findings of the analysis
of variance for the eight probability measures. The terms
in the analysis of variance which are relevant to this
hypothesis are self-esteem (S-E) and the interactions
between self-esteem, sex (S) and role (R).
The main effect of the level of S-E was not significant
for any of the eight probability measures. The sex by
self-esteem interaction for measure E (i.e., the probability
that the subject will respond non-cooperatlvely following
a trial on which he responded non-cooperatively) was
significant at the .025 level. This is a measure of
the subject's persistence in the non-cooperative response.
Figure 1 shows the sex by self-esteem interaction for
this measure.
There was no consistant pattern for the members
of the high and medium S-E children's families to be
less likely to respond non-cooperatively following a
trial on which they responded non-cooperatively than
for the members of the low S-E families. A Tukey test
(Myers, 1966) of the difference between the medium S-E
male and female groups indicated that the members of
the female subjects' families approached the usual
level of significance (p<.10) in their persistence in
the non-cooperative choice as compared to the medium
6o
Table 5 : Summary of the significant findings for the Analyses of
Variance of the eight probability measures: A, B, E, F, X, Y, Z, W.
ABE
1. Total
2 . Between
subjects
3. Sex (S)
H. Self-esteem
(S-E)
5. Role .001
6. S X S-E .025
7. S X R
8. S-E X R
9. S X S-E X R .07
10. Ermr
(N/SS-ER
11. Within
subjects
12. Dyadic
partner (DP) .001 .005 *05
13. DP X S .025
Ik. DP X E
15. DP X R
16. DP X S X S-E
17. DP X S X R
F X Y Z W
.08
.005 .001
.09
.005 .005 .08 .025
.05
.08
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A B E F X Y
18 . DP X S-E X R
19. DP X S X S-E X R .09 .03
20. Error
(N X DP/S-ER
21. Trial
Block (T) .001 .001 .001 .001 .01 .001
22. T X S
23. T X S-E .001
2h. T X R
25. T X S X
S-E .025
26
.
T X S X R .05 .05 .05
27. T X S-E X R .10
28 . T X S X S-E
X R
o\CM Error
(T X N/SS-ER)
30. DP X T
31. DP X T X S .10 .05 .005
32. DP X T X
S-E .025
33. DP X T X R
34. DP X T X S
X S-E .005 .05 .025
w
.005
.025
35 DP X T X
S X R 08
62
ABEFXYZW
36. DP X T X
S-E X R
37. DP X T X S
X S-E X R
38. Error
(N X DP X
T/SS-ER)
.05 .10 .10
<>3
Figure 1: The interaction between sex and level of self-esteem (S-E)
for measure E: the probability that the subject responds non-cooperativelj
following his own non-cooperative response.
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S-E male subjects* families. This sex by S-E difference
had not been predicted. The S-E by sex interaction was
not significant for any of the remaining probability
measures. The S-E by role interaction was not significant
for any of the eight probability measures.
The sex by self-esteem by role interaction approached
the usual level of significance for the measure of the
probability that the subject will respond cooperatively
following his own cooperative response on the preceeding
trial (B)
,
and for the measure of the probability that
the subject will respond cooperatively following the
other subject's non-cooperative response on the pre-
ceeding trial (F). Table 6 presents the mean probabilities
for the sex by S-E by role interaction for measure 3.
The interaction of sex by S-E by role for the
measure of the subjects' persistence in the cooperative
response, B* approached the usual level of significance
(p .07). The most striking differences occurred among
the children and are presented in Figure 2.
Comparisons of the means for the different groups
using the Tukey method (Myers, 1966) yielded the follow-
ing significant findings. The high S-E girls were sig-
nificantly (p.^. 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively
than were the high S-E boys. The probabilities here
indicated that after the high S-E girl responded cooper-
atively there was a one out of three chance that her
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Table 6 : The sex by self-esteem by role interaction for measure
B, the probability that the subject will respond cooperatively
following his own cooperative response on the proceeding trial.
(F = .07)
MALE FEMALE
ROLE
High
S-E
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
High
S-E
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
Child .17 .35 .21 .32 .19 .20
Mother .32 .36 .1*3 . 3U .35 .37
Father .27 .30 .21 .27 .30 .29
Probability
.37
.35
.33
.31
.29
.21
.25
.23
.21
.19
.17
.15
HIGH MED LOW
S-E S-E S-E
Firrure 2: The interaction between sex, level of self-esteem (S-E) and
role for measure B: the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively followinfs; his own cooperative response.
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next response would be cooperative
,
while for the high
S-E boy, the probability that his next response would
be cooperative was less than one out of five. The
situation described above changes radically for the
medium S-E children. The boys were significantly
(p<^. 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively after
their own cooperative responses on the proceeding trial
than were the girls. In fact, the actual probabilities
were approximately the same as for the high S-E children,
but here the boys had a probability of persisting in
the cooperative response of
.35 and the girls' probability
was .19* It should also be noted that the high S-E
girls were significantly (p \ 05 ) more likely to persist
in their cooperative response than were the medium S-E
girls i whereas, the high S-E boys were significantly
(p . 05 ) less likely to follow a cooperative response
with another cooperative response than were the medium
S-E boys* Both the low S-E boys and girls had relatively
low probabilities of continuing to respond cooperatively
after a preceeding cooperative response. The low S-E
girls were similar to the medium S-E girls i both were
significantly (p . 05 ) less persistent in the cooperative
response than were the high S-E girls.
The high, medium, and low S-E boys and girls' mothers'
probability of responding cooperatively following their
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own cooperative responses on the preceeding trial (B)
were quite similar. Comparison of pairs of means for
these groups with the Tukey test indicated that there
was no significant difference, between the groups of
mothers, in their persistence in the cooperative response.
Similarly, it was found that there was no significant
difference between the high, medium, and low S-E boys
and girls' fathers in their performance on measure B,
The sex by self-esteem by role interaction for
measure P, the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following the other player's non-cooperative
response on the preceeding trial, approached the usual
level of significance (p .09). Comparison by means
of the Tukey method of the high, medium, and low S-E
boys in their probability of responding cooperatively
following their parents' non-cooperative response in-
dicated that there was no significant difference between
the groups. The high S-E girls were significantly (p<\05)
more likely to respond cooperatively than were the medium
S-E girls, but not significantly more likely to respond
cooperatively than the low S-E girls. There was a
tendency for the high S-E girls to be significantly
(p .10) more likely to respond cooperatively than were
the high S-E boys following a non-cooperative response
by their parent. The data for this Interaction is included
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in Table 7.
Overall, there was little support for the hypothesis
that the members of the low S-E children’s families
will be characterized by a lower probability of responding
cooperatively and a higher probability of responding
non-cooperatively than will the members of the families
of medium and high S-E children.
6) HYPOTHESIS 3.
Hypothesis 3 stated that i As the P.D. game proceeds
over 50 trials the probability that the members of
the medium and high self-esteem families will respond
cooperatively will increase, while that of the members
of the low self-esteem families will decrease. In this
study trials were grouped into five blocks of ten trials
each. This hypothesis refers to the interactions of
level of self-esteem with trial blocks (T).
The interaction of trial block by level of self-
esteem for measure A, the probability that the subject
responds cooperatively following a trial in which the
other player responded cooperatively, was highly signif-
icant (p<^.001). Figure 3 presents the interaction of
trial block by level of self-esteem for this measure.
The mean probabilities for the high, medium, and low
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Table The sex by self-esteem by role interaction for measure F,
the probability that the subject vill respond cooperatively follow-
ing the other subject's non-cooperative response on the preceeding
trial. (F = .09)
MALE FEMALE
ROLE
High
S-E
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
High
S-E
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
Child .31 .32 .27 .43 .26 .34
Mother .35 .34 .b0 .35 .37 .32
Father .31 .27 .19 .33 .31 .39
Figure 3: The interaction between trial block (T) and level of self-
esteem (S-E) for measure A: the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a cooperative response by the other player.
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S-E groups at each level of trials for measure A is
presented in Table 8.
The interaction presented in Figure 3 is quite clear.
It became progressively less likely that the members
of the medium and low self-esteem families would respond
cooperatively following the cooperative response of the
other player. For the members of the high self-esteem
families, the probability that they would respond cooper-
atively to the cooperative response of the other player
remained fairly constant.
A comparison, using the Tukey method, of the mean
probability for the first trial block and each subsequent
trial block for the S-E by trial block interaction led
to the following significant findings. There was no
significant difference for the members of the high S-E
families in the probability that they responded cooper-
atively in the first block of ten trials and each of
the subsequent trial blocks. However, the members of
the medium and low S-E families were significantly
(p<^. 05 ) less likely to respond cooperatively following
the other subject's cooperative response on the proceed-
ing trials (A) on each block of trials subsequent to
the first.
The interaction of trial block by S-E by sex for
measure A was significant (p .025)* Table 9 presents
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Table 8t Trial Block by Self-Esteem Interaction for
Measure Ai The Probability That The Subject Responds
Cooperatively Following A Trial In Which The Other
Player Responded Cooperatively.
Self-Esteem Trial Block
T
i
TL
2
T
3
T4 T 5
High S-E .32 .29 .35 .31 .32
Medium S-E .36 .31 .28 .22 OCM•
Low S-E .36 .24 .27 -3-CM• .21
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Table 9 • The trial block by S-E by sex interaction for measure A,
the probability that the subject responds cooperatively following a
trial on which the other subject responded cooperatively (F = .025)
HIGH S-E
MEDIUM S-E
LOW S-E
Tl T2 T3 T U T 5
Male .32 .32 .31 .29 .35
Female .31 .27 .39 .3b .31
Male .37 .31 .31 .31 .31
Female .35 .31 . 2b .13 .09
Male VOon• .25 .30 .25 .20
Female .36 .2b .26 .2b .20
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the mean probabilities for this interaction. The
response curves for the high and low S-E groups appear
to be similar to each other and to those previously
discussed for the S-E by trial block interaction.
However, there were significant (p .05) differences
between the means for the medium S-E male and female
groups. Figure 4 presents the S-E by trial block by
sex Interaction for measure A.
For both the male and female high S-E groups the
probability of responding cooperatively after the other
person responded cooperatively remains fairly stable.
The members of the low S-E male and female families
became Increasingly less likely to respond cooperatively
to the other person's cooperative response on the
preceeding trial as the game progressed. There was a
difference between the response patterns of the families
of the medium S-E male and female subjects. The
members of the medium S-E boys' families tended to respond
like the members of the high S-E boys' families. That
is, their probability of responding cooperatively after
the other player responds cooperatively remained constant
over the fifty trials. The members of the medium S-E
girls' families became increasingly less likely to respond
cooperatively after the other person responded cooper-
atively. Their behavior on the P.D. game was similar
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Figure U.l: The interaction between sex, trial block ( T ) and aelf-
esteen (S-E) for measure A: the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a cooperative response by the other player.
77
l.oc
I
Figure 4,2: (continued)
Figure U.3: (continued)
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to the members of the low S-E female subjects* families
j
with the exception that they became less cooperative
than the members of the low S-E families. In comparing
the two groups of medium S-E families in this interaction
by means of the Tukey method, it was found that for the
third, fourth, and fifth trial blocks the members of
the female subjects* families were slgnificantly (p , 05)
less cooperative than the members of the male subjects'
families.
The interaction between self-esteem and trial block
for measure Z, the probability that the subject will
respond cooperatively following a trial on which he
responded non-cooperatively and the other player responded
cooperatively, following a trial on which he received
a bonus payoff for not cooperating, was significant
(p 4*025). Choosing a cooperative response after having
been rewarded for a non-cooperative response would appear
to be the most difficult choice that the P.D. game offers.
In this game situation, there would appear to be consider-
able pressure supporting a non-cooperative response.
The mean probabilities for this interaction are presented
in Table 10 i Figure 5 presents this interaction in graphic
form.
The data for this interaction was further studied
using the Tukey method (Myers, 1966). The members of
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Table 10: The trial block by self-esteem (S-E) interaction
for measure Z_: the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial on which he responded non-
cooperatively and the other player responded cooperatively.
SELF-ESTEEM TRIAL BLOCK
T
i
T T
3
T
u
T
5
High S-E .43 .45 .63 .32 CO
Medium S-E oo-3-• .59 .46 .28 .25
Low S-E .55 .40 .29 .25 .26
I
Probability
Fifpire 5: Tine interaction between trial block (T) and self-esteem (8-E)
for measure 7: the probability that the subject will respond cooperatively
following a response in which he responded non -cooperatively and the other
subject responded cooperatively.
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the low S—E group Initially switched from a non-cooperative
response after having been rewarded for not cooperating
over 50 percent of the time. During the second block
of ten trials they switched to a cooperative response
40 percent of the time; this decrement was significant
(p<^.05). In the next block of ten trials, the probability
that the members of the low S-E families responded cooper-
atively after having responded non-cooperatively and
been rewarded drops to
. 29 ; again this was a significant
(p <^05) decrement. During the remaining two trial blocks
there was again a slight decrement and the probability
of switching to a cooperative response remains at about
.25.
The members of the medium S-E families responded
somewhat differently to being rewarded for the non-cooper-
ative response. During the first block of ten trials, the
probability that these subjects would switch from a non-
cooperative response to a cooperative response was .48.
During the second block of ten trials the probability
that the medium self-esteem subjects would switch from
a non-cooperative to a cooperative response after
receiving the bonus increases to .59» which was a sig-
nificant (p .05) increment. However, at this point,
the curve sharply changes direction and during the next
two blocks of ten trials, there were significant
(p .05) decrements to .46 and to .28. This curve then
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seems to level off at . 25 .
The members of the high S-E families have an initial
non-significant increase in the probability that they
will switch to a cooperative from a non-cooperative response
after receiving the bonus. During the third block of
trials, there was a sharp increment in the probability
that they would switch to a cooperative response from
,45 to . 63 . This increment was significant (p^.05).
During the fourth block of trials, the members of the
high self-esteem families became significantly (p<‘ , 05 )
less likely to switch their response to a cooperative
one, with the probability dropping to .32. However,
in the last block of trials, the members of the high
self-esteem families seemed to recover and again became
more prone to switching to the cooperative from the non-
cooperative response. The probability of making a cooper-
ative response shifted from .32 to .48; this shift was
significant (p^. 05 ).
d) HYPOTHESIS 4.
Hypothesis 4 stated thati In the interactions
between the parents of the low S-E children there will
be lower probabilities of responding cooperatively and
lower probabilities of responses which would resolve
conflict than in the interactions between the parents
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of the medium and high S-E children. Referring back
to Table 5» the following terms were used to evaluate
this hypothesis: S-E by Role of Dyadic Partner, and
S-E by Role by Dyadic Partner by Sex.
There were no significant findings on any of the
eight probability measures for the S-E by Role by
Dyadic Partner interaction. However, significant
differences in the way that the parents behaved with
each other emerged for the S-E by Role by Dyadic Partner
by Sex interaction.
Measure P, the probability that the subject will
respond cooperatively following the other player's non-
cooperative response on the preceeding trial is both
a measure of the likelihood that the subject will respond
cooperatively as well as an index of the subject's
ability to resolve conflict. The difference between
means for the dyadic partner by role by self-esteem
by sex interaction for this measure approached the
usual level of significance (p .09) and is presented
in Table 11. In evaluating this hypothesis only the
portion of the interaction which involves the parents
is of Interest. This part of the interaction is presented
in Figure 6.
The mothers' and fathers' probability that they
would respond cooperatively following a non-cooperative
response on the preceeding trial by their spouse (Measure P)
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Table'll: The mean probabilities for the sex by self-esteem
by role by dyadic partner interaction for measure F, the
probability that the subject will respond cooperatively fol-
lowing the other subject's non-cooperative response on the pre-
ceeding trial. (F = .09)
Mother
Child
Father
Child
Mother
High
S-E
MALE
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
High
S-E
FEMALE
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
.37 .41 .44 .37 .39 .36
.33 .40 .33 .49 .25 .33
.35 .23 .21 .35 .33 .32
.30 .23 .21 .37 .26 .34
.32 .27 .35 .33 .35 .27
.27 .31 .17 .30 .29 .45Father
n?
.55
robability
.V
.
1*3
.39
.35
.31
.27
.23
.19
.15
.00
boys' mothers - /
VA /
HIGH
S-E
MED
G-E
LOW
G-E
/
girls' fathers -
I
I
X
I \
I \
girls' mothers -
HIGH
S-E
MED
S-E
mmmmm
LOW
S-E
Figure 6: The Interaction between self-esteem (S-F), sex and role for measure
F: the probability that the subject will respond cooperatively following
the other player' • non-cooperative response on the proceeding trial.
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was compared for each S-E group by means of the Tukey
method (Myers, 1966). There were no significant differences
found between the high and medium S-E male and female
subjects' mothers' and fathers' performance on this
measure. However, the probabilities were significantly
(p^.05) different for the parents of the low S-E male
and female subjects. The low S-E boys' mother had a
probability of responding cooperatively after her husband's
non-cooperative response of
.35 while her husband's pro-
bability of responding cooperatively after she responded
non-cooperatively was .17* The low S-E girls' fathers'
probability of responding cooperatively after his wife
responds non-cooperatively is .45» while his wife's
probability of responding cooperatively after he responds
non-cooperatively was
. 27 .
There was a tendency for the low S-E boys' mothers
to be significantly . 10 ) more cooperative than were
the mothers of the medium S-E boys, not significantly
different, however, from the high S-E boys' mothers
when playing the P.D. game with their husbands. The
fathers of the low S-E boys were significantly (p^.05)
less likely to respond cooperatively after their wives
responded non-cooperatively than were the fathers of
the medium and high S-E boys.
The mothers of the low S-E girls tended to be signif-
icantly (p . 10 ) less likely to respond cooperatively
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after their husbands responded non-cooperatlvely than
were the mothers of the medium S-E girls. The difference
between the low and high S-E mothers was not significant.
The fathers of the low S-E girls were significantly
(p .05) more likely to respond cooperatively after
their wives responded non-cooperatlvely than were the
fathers of the medium and high S-E girls.
Measure Y is the probability that the subject will
respond cooperatively following a trial in which he
responded cooperatively and the other subject responded
non-cooperatlvely i following a trial in which he received
the "sucker's” payoff (-10) and the other subject received
the bonus payoff (+10). The dyadic partner by role by
sex by self-esteem interaction for this measure was
significant (p<^ .03) and is presented in Table 12.
In evaluating this hypothesis, the Interaction between
the parents which is presented in Figure 7 is relevant.
The mean probabilities for measure Y were compared
using the Tukey test (Myers, 1966). There was no sig-
nificant difference in the probability that the mother
or father of the high and medium S-E male and female
subjects would respond cooperatively following a response
in which they responded cooperatively and their spouse
responded non-cooperatively. However, among the parents
of the low S-E children, there was a significant difference
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Table 12? The mean probabilities for the sex by self-esteem by
dyadic partner by role interaction of measure Y; the probability
that the subject will respond cooperatively following a trial
in which he responded cooperatively and the other subject re-
sponded non-cooperatively. (F = .03)
MALE FEMALE
High
S-E
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
High
S-E
Medium
S-E
Low
S-E
Mother .25 .42 .42 .39 .27 .42
Child .17 .44 .34 .45 .22 .15
Father .34 .33 .27 .38 .42 .25
Child .16 .20 .17 .28 .20 .20
Mother ,2b .30 .49 .26 .32 .30
Father .20 .31 .16 .24 .26 .56
.55
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.51
Probability
.
1*7
.**3
.39
.35
.31
.27
.23
.19
.15
.00
bovs' fathers - \
\
KISH 'IED LOW
S-E S-E 3-E
HIGH MED LOW
S-E S-E S-E
Figure 7: The Interaction between sel^-esteem (S-E), sex and role for measure
Yi the probability that the subject will respond cooperatively following a
rc3ponse in which he responded cooperatively and the other player responded
non-cooperatively
.
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(P<*05) In the parents' probabilities that the one
would respond cooperatively following a trial in which
he (she) cooperated and his (her) spouse did not.
The mothers of the low S-E boys were significantly
(p . 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively after
having received the "sucker's" payoff in a game with
their husbands than were the mothers of the medium and
high self-esteem boys. The mean probabilities for
the high, medium, and low S-E groups of mothers of
male subjects weret .24, .30, and .49. There was no
significant difference between the mothers of the high
and medium S-E boys in the likelihood that they would
respond cooperatively after receiving the sucker's"
payoff.
The fathers of the low S-E boys were significantly
(p '
.
05 ) less cooperative than the fathers of the medium
S-E boys after they responded cooperatively and their
wives responded non-cooperatively. However, there was
no significant difference in the probability that the
low S-E boys' fathers would respond cooperatively after
receiving the "sucker's" payoff as compared to the high
S-E boys' fathers; the probabilities for the fathers
of the high and medium S-E boys did not differ for this
measure.
There was no significant difference in the pro-
bability that the mothers of the high, medium, and low
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S-E girls would respond cooperatively after they had
received the "sucker's" payoff.
Che fathers of the low S-E girls were significantly
(P< *05) more likely to respond cooperatively after
receiving the "sucker's" payoff than were either the
medium or high S-E girls' fathers. There was no sig-
nificant difference between the fathers of the high and
medium S-E girls for this measure. The mean probabilities
for the fathers of the high, medium, and low S-E girls
were t .24, .2?, and . 56 .
e) HYPOTHESIS 5.
Hypothesis 5 stated thati a)The interactions
between the father and son of the high self-esteem boys
will be characterized by greater probabilities of cooper-
ative responses and high probabilities of responses that
would reduce conflict than in the interactions between
the medium and low self-esteem boys and his father.
b)The interactions between the mother and daughter of
the high self-esteem girls will be characterized by
greater probabilities of cooperative response and higher
probabilities of responses that would reduce conflict
than in the interactions between the medium and low
self-esteem girl and her mother. This hypothesis pre-
dicts a more cooperative, less conflictual pattern of
interaction on the P.D. game between the high self-esteem
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child and the same sex parent as compared to the pattern
of interaction between the same sex parent and the medium
and low self-esteem child. In evaluating this hypothesis
we are again interested in the interaction of the dyadic
partner by level of self-esteem by role and by sex.
The DP X S-E X H X S interaction for the F index,
the measure of the probability that the subject will
respond cooperatively following the other player's non-
cooperative response on the preceeding play, approached
the usual level of significance (p<,.09). This inter-
action was presented in Table 11. Figure 8 presents
the mean probabilities for the interaction between the
parent and the same sex child.
The mean probabilities on the F measure for the
high, medium, and low S-E boys' fathers respectively
are: .35, .23, and .21. Tukey tests applied to
this data showed that the fathers of the high S-E boys
were significantly (p<.05) higher on the F measure
than were the fathers of the medium and low S-E boys.
The difference between the fathers of the medium and
low S-E boys was not significant.
The high S-E boy tended to be significantly
(p .10) more likely to respond cooperatively following
a non-cooperative response by his father than was the
medium self-esteem boyi he was also significantly
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Figure 8: The Interaction between self-esteem (S-E), sex and role for measure
F: the probability that the subject will respond cooperatively following the
other player's non-cooperative response on the preceedinp trial.
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(P<C*°5) more likely to respond cooperatively to his
father's non-cooperative response than was the low self-
esteem boy. The mean probabilities that the high, medium
and low self-esteem boys would respond cooperatively
following a non-cooperative response by their fathers
were*
.30, . 23» and .21. The differences between
the medium and low self-esteem boy on this measure was
not significant.
There were no significant differences between the
high S-E son and his father, the medium self-esteem
son and his father, and the low self-esteem son and
his father on the F measure.
The interaction between dyadic partner, self-esteem,
role, and sex for measure Y, the probability that the
subject will respond cooperatively after he had responded
cooperatively and the other player had responded non-
cooperatively, was significant (p .03). This inter-
action was presented in Table 12. The interaction between
the child and the same sex parent is presented in Figure 9.
Further analysis of this data with the Tukey method
appears to support partially this hypothesis. The fathers
of the high S-E boys were significantly (p .05) more
likely to respond cooperatively after receiving the
•'sucker's" payoff in a game with their sons than were
the high S-E boys in the equivalent situation with their
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Figure 9: The interaction between self-esteem (S-E), sex and role for measure
Y: the probability that a subject* will respond cooperatively following a response
in which he responded cooperatively and the other player responded non-
cooperat Ively.
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fathers. The fathers of the medium S-E hoys tended to
he significantly (p .10) more likely to respond cooper-
atively after receiving the "sucker's" payoff in a game
with their son than were the medium S-E hoys in a game
with their fathers. However, the fathers of the low
S-E hoys were not significantly more likely to respond
cooperatively after receiving the "sucker's" payoff than
were their sons.
In relation to the mother-daughter interaction
(Figure 8), there was no significant difference in the
probability that the mothers of the high, medium, and
low self-esteem girls would respond cooperatively following
a response in which their daughters responded non-cooper-
atlvely (F) . The high self-esteem girls were significantly
(p ' . 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively on measure
F than were the medium and low self-esteem girls. The
medium S-E girls were significantly (p<^,05) less likely
to respond cooperatively on this measure than were the
low S-E girls.
The high self-esteem girls were significantly (p^.05)
more likely to respond cooperatively following a non-
cooperative response than were their mothers. The
medium S—E girls were significantly (p .05) less likely
to respond cooperatively for this measure (F) than were
their mothers. There was no significant difference
between the low self-esteem girls and their mothers in
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in the prooabillty that one would respond cooperatively
following the other's non-cooperative response on the
preceeding play.
The high S-E girl was significantly (p ,05)
more likely (Y, Figure 9) to respond cooperatively after
she had responded cooperatively and her mother had responded
non-cooperatlvely than were the medium and low S-E girls.
There was no significant difference between the medium
and low self-esteem girls on this measure. The mothers
of the medium S-E girls tended to be significantly
(p .10) less likely to respond cooperatively after they
had responded cooperatively and their daughters responded
non-cooperatively than were the mothers of the high and
low S-E girls. There was no significant difference
between the high and low self-esteem mothers on this
measure.
There was no significant difference in the mothers'
and daughters' probability of responding cooperatively
for measure Y for the high and medium S-E subjects.
However
,
for this measure, the mothers of the low S-E
girls were significantly (p^. 05 ) more likely to respond
cooperatively than were their daughters,
f) ADDITIONAL FINDINGS.
The following results apply to the S-E by role of
100
dyadic partner by sex interaction for measure P (i.e.,
the probability that the subject will respond cooperatively
following a non-cooperative response by the other subject)
and measure Y (i.e., the probability that the subject
will respond cooperatively following a response in which
he responded cooperatively and the other subject responded
non-cooperatively ) • The high S-E boy responded with
the same probability of cooperation to both his father
and mother. However, the low and medium S-E boys were
significantly (p<^. 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively
to their mothers* non-cooperative response than to their
fathers*. There was no significant difference in the
probability that the medium and low S-E girls would
respond cooperatively to either parent's non-cooperative
response. However, the high S-E girls were significantly
(p ^. 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively to their
mothers* non-cooperative response than to their fathers'.
The fathers of the low self-esteem girls were
significantly (p . 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively
to their wives' non-cooperative response than they were
to their daughters' non-cooperative response. The fathers
of the high S-E girls tended to be significantly (p<.10)
more likely to respond cooperatively to their daughters
after receiving the "sucker's" payoff (measure Y) than
to their wives • The fathers of the medium S-E girls
were significantly (p<. 05 ) more likely to respond
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cooperatively to their daughters than to their wives
on this measure (Y).
There was no significant difference in the probability
that the fathers of the low S-E boys would respond cooper-
atively to their sons or wives when either one of them
had responded non-cooperatively. However, the fathers
of the high S-E boys were significantly (p^ .05) more
likely to respond cooperatively following their sons*
non-cooperative response as opposed to their wives*.
There was no significant difference in the probability
that the mothers of the high S-E boys would respond cooper-
atively following their sons* or husbands' non-cooper-
ative response. The mothers of the medium S-E boys were
significantly (p . 05 ) more likely to respond cooperatively
following their sons' non-cooperative response as opposed
to their husbands'. The mothers of the low S-E boys
were quite cooperative following both their husbands
'
and sons' non-cooperative response.
The mothers of the low S-E girls were significantly
(p . 05 ) less likely to respond cooperatively following
their husbands* non-cooperative response as opposed to
their daughters'. There was no significant difference
in the probability that the mothers of the medium S-E
girls would respond cooperatively following a non-cooper-
ative response by either their husbands or daughters.
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The mothers of the high self-esteem girls were significantly
(P'y *05) more likely to respond cooperatively after receiv-
ing the "sucker* s" payoff (measure Y) when playing with
their daughters as opposed to their husbands.
The effect of role, that is whether the subject
was a child, mother, or father, appeared to be a sig-
nificant determinant of the probability that the subject
would respond cooperatively. Table 13 presents the
mean probabilities and the level of significance for
the main effect of role for: B (i.e., the subject's
persistence in the cooperative response), X (i.e., the
probability that the subject will respond cooperatively
following a trial on which both he and the other subject
responded cooperatively), and Y(i,e,, the probability
that the subject will respond cooperatively following
a trial on which he responded cooperatively and the
other subject responded non-cooperatively)
.
On the three measures cited above the mother is
most likely to respond cooperatively, the father is
second, and the child is least likely to respond cooper-
atively. A Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by
Ranks was performed on these nine means. The non-para-
metric statistic was used to compare this data, which
was not necessarily based on the same scale and which
may have been correlated. The result of this analysis
(chi 2r = 30) was significant (p<£.001). Although this
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Table 1 3 : The mean
main effect of role
probabilities and level of significance for the
for three probability measures.
PROBABILITY
MEASURE CHILD MOTHER FATHER
B .24 .36
t—
CVJ *#*
X .26 .40 .32 **
Y .32 .34 .31 ***
** p .005
**# P 001
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finding is not surprising, it is extremely reliable.
The main effect of the dyadic partner variable was
significant for six of the probability (A, B, E, F, X, Z)
and a seventh (Y) approached significance. Table 14
presents the mean probabilities and the level of significance
for the main effect of dyadic partner.
Each of the three family members played the P.D.
game twice, once with each of the remaining family members.
The dyadic partner term refers to the "other player"
or to the two games played. However, in order to know
which family member the game was being played with, it
is necessary to know which role (R) the other player
had. There are six possible dyadic partner by role
combinations which are psychologically meaningful. There
are only two levels of dyadic partner; schematically,
this is represented by the following matrix
«
D.P. l D.P.2
C M
C P
M P
The significant dyadic partner effect indicates that
those subjects grouped in D.P.^ are more cooperative
than those subjects grouped in D.P.2* Since many of
the important variables (i.e., self-esteem, sex, role)
are collapsed in this measure, it would seem to offer
minimal information about family interaction patterns.
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Table 1^: The mean probabilities and level of
for the main effect of dyadic partner (DP) for
probability measures.
significance
seven
PR0B^3ILITY
MEASURES DP, DP1 ur2
A
.32 .25 ***
B
.32 .27 *#
E oco• .82 ++
F
.35 .30 *#
X
.37 .28 **
Y .32 .27 +
Z ,U6 .36 +++
+ P aoO• ** P • oo vn
++ P .05 **# p .001
+++ p .025
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The dyadic partner term may be meaningfully viewed as
an intermediate statistical step necessary to derive
the psychologically meaningful dyadic partner by role
term, which indicates how a specific individual in the
family interacts with either of the two remaining family
members
•
The main effect of trial block (T) was significant
for the eight probability measures (A, B, E, F, X» Y,
Z, W)
.
The mean probabilities for each trial block and
the level of significance for the main effect on the
ANOVA is presented in Table 15. There was a significant
decrease in the subjects' probability of responding
cooperatively as a function of time.
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Table The mean probabilities and level of significance
for the main effect of trial block for the eight probability-
measures.
PROBABILITY TRIAL BLOCK
MEASURE
T
1
T
2
T
3
T
u
T
5
A .35 .28 .30 .26 .24
B .34 .30 .31 .27 .25 *#*
E .79 .80 .81 .82 .81 ***
F .37 .33 .33 .29 .29 ***
X .38 .30 .36 .29 .28 *
Y .36 .32 .31 .24 .24
***
Z .49 .48 .46 .28 .33
**#
w .71 .54 .6l .60 .49
**
* P .01
*# P .005
***
P .001
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The major findings of the present study may be
organized in terms of the following questions. "Did
the members of the high, medium, and low S-E children's
families differ in their cooperative behavior on the
P,D. game?" "Did the interaction patterns within the
family dyads differ in relation to the child's level
of self-esteem?"
In answer to the first question, significant differ-
ences did emerge in the temporal pattern of cooperation
for the high, medium, and low S-E groups. The most
important finding was that the members of the high S-E
families remained relatively constant in their probabilities
of responding cooperatively, while the members of the
low S-E families became less cooperative. In answer
to the second question, the child's level of S-E was
related to significant differences in the intraparental
relationship as well as the relationship between the
male children and their fathers. These, as well as
less important findings, will be discussed in greater
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detail, after which a more theoretical discussion of
the relationship between the present findings and
family process will be presented.
a) RESULTS.
Method
i
The sample of 60 families of seventh
grade students represented approximately 12% of the
seventh grade class of a suburban junior high school.
The single dimension within which the groups in the
sample differed significantly was that of the child's
level of self-esteems with this exception it was an
extremely homogeneous sample.
One of the assumptions underlying the use of the
P.D. game in psychological research is that the subjects'
game behavior is representative of or analogous to their
real life behavior in specific situations. If the P.D.
game is to be considered valid it must be demonstrated
that the game was played in a systematic or non-random
way. There is a good deal of evidence that the P.D.
game was not played randomly. If it had been, then the
expected overall percent of cooperative choice (C) would
have been 50% and the percent of mutually cooperative
choice (PC) or percent of mutually non-cooperative choice
(DD) would have been 25$. The obtained frequencies for
these measures werei C = 35$» CC = 13«7$» anc^ DD = ^3.9$i
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Indicating that the family members did not respond
randomly and that they had a non-cooperative or com-
petitive orientation.
The expected probability that a subject will respond
non-cooperatlvely following his own non-cooperative response
on the preceedlng trial (E) if the subject is choosing
randomly is
. 25« For the six self-esteem by sex t groups
of subjects, the obtained probability that a subject
will persist in the non-cooperative response was above
• 75» This finding also supports tha notion that the
subjects played the game with a strong non-cooperative
orientation.
There are several possible explanations for this
relatively non-cooperative or competitive bias in the
present study. The family members may have interpreted
the experimental procedure as a "zero sum" as opposed
to a "non-zero sum" game (dapoport, 1966). The goal
that was suggested in the instructions of this study
was to get as many points for yourself as possible; it
was further suggested that the number of points the
other player received that not important. Possibly
the instructions did not clearly establish the situation
as a non-zero sum game, an unintended bias that could
be easily corrected in future research.
A second explanation for the competitive orientation
of the subjects may be that the payoff matrix was skewed
towards a competitive game and the subjects responded
to this implicit competitive definition.Rapoport and
Orwant (1962) suggest that an index of competitive ad-
vantage can be obtained by subtracting the X2 payoff
from the Xj payoff. Gallo and McClintock (1965) report
that the effect of enlarging this index is to produce
a large number of competitive responses. The competitive
index for the matrix used in the present study would
be 20, while the competitive index for the frequently
used matrix cited earlier (Gallo and McClintock, 1965)
would be 10.
A third possible explanation for the subjects com-
petitive orientation may be that this represents the
actual situation within these families. The families
in the study were all upper middle class and may prize
competition (Crowne, 1966). In addition, recent studies
(Swingle & Gillis, 1968? Vinacke, 1969) suggest that
under some conditions the degree of friendship or close-
ness "can have two different implications in game, either
signifying freedom to play competitively (so long as
the basic relation is not violated) , or constraint
against offending each other." In any case, this com-
petitive orientation probably limited the amount of
information available since the cooperative motive was
not as salient as the competitive motive.
112
Cooperative Behavior: The Interaction patterns
on the P.D. game can be viewed as experimental analogues
of the subject's typical ways of responding to the
other members of the family. One of the problems In
using this game to study the present problem Is that
it could not be determined a priori which of the many
measures available would be the most productive for
viewing the patterns of Interaction within families.
The P.D. game provides two broad classes of data, fre-
quency and probability measures. The first two hypotheses
predicted that members of the low S-E families would
be less cooperative in the P.D. game than members of
high and medium S-E families. The first hypothesis
refers to the frequency measures and states that* the
members of the families of the low S-E children will be
less cooperative and have a greater incidence of the
mutually non-cooperative response than will the members
of the medium and high 3-E families. This hypothesis
refers to the measures of the percentage of cooperative
response (C), mutually cooperative response (CC), and
mutually non-cooperative response (DD). The second
hypothesis refers to the probability measures and states
that i Members of families of low S-E children will be
characterized by a lower probability of responding
cooperatively, or a higher probability of responding
non—cooperatively than will members of families of medium
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and high S-E children.
The findings did not support the first hypothesis
j
there were no significant differences between the members
of the high, medium, and low S-E groups in their percentages
of cooperative (D), mutually cooperative (CC), and mutually
non-cooperative (DD) responses. It may be that these
measures were not sensitive enough to pick up the subtle
differences in the patterns of interaction between the
members of the three different S-E groups. Apparently,
behavior on the P.D. game is very complex and requires
more sensitive measurement than can be achieved with
percentages or frequencies.
The second hypothesis was based on the assumption
that there would be a direct, linear relationship between
the child's level of S-E and the probabilities of responding
cooperatively within the family. It was predicted that:
Members of families of low S-E children will be character-
ized by a lower probability of responding cooperatively
and a higher probability of responding non-cooperatively
,
than will the members of families of medium and high
S-E children. The data did not support this hypothesis.
One assumption that was Implied in hypothesis2 was
that there would be no difference in the interactions
of the male and female subjects. The literature has
not been specific in pointing to differences that might
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be expected from the interaction of variables such as
self-esteem and sex role. Coopersmith's ( 1967 ) extensive
study of self-esteem in children was conducted entirely
with boys. The interaction of sex by level of S-E by
role for measure B, the probability that the subject
will respond cooperatively following his own cooperative
response on the preceeding trial, approached the usual
level of significance. In looking at the child's persistence
in the cooperative response, it was evident that there
was not a linear relationship between S-E without con-
sideration of the Influence of the child's sex on this
variable.
The high S-E boys were significantly less likely
to respond cooperatively than were the high S-E girls
or the medium S-E boys. The medium S-E boys were sig-
nificantly more likely to respond cooperatively on this
measure than were the medium S-E girls who had a comparatively
low probability of responding cooperatively. Both the
low S-E boys and girls had a relatively low probability
of continuing to respond cooperatively. The assumption
that the children's probability of responding cooperatively
was a linear, positive function of their level of S-E
was not supported. It would appear that the sex-role
of the child is an Important mediating factor in the
probability that he would have responded cooperatively.
Carlson (1970) has called attention to previously ignored
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sex differences in the behavior of Individuals at similar
levels of S-S.
The lack of support for the hypotheses that the
members of the low S-E families would have lower probabilities
of responding cooperatively and high probabilities of
responding non-cooperatlvely than the members of the
high and medium S-E families may in part be a function
of summing the probabilities over the fifty trials that
made up each P.D. game. The lack of support for both
hypothesis 1 and 2 may be a function of the statistical
treatment of the data.
It was predicted in the third hypothesis thatj As
the P.D. game proceeds over 50 trials the probability
that the members of the high and medium S-E families
will respond cooperatively will increase while that of
the members of the low S-E families will decrease. This
hypothesis is similar to the previous twot it was predicted
that as the family members interact over time the perform-
ance of the members of the low S-E families would have
become progressively less cooperative while the members
of the other groups would have become more cooperative.
This has a great deal of significance for family theory
since one of the essential features (Haley, 19&2) of family
relations is that they continue over time and that most
of the Issues that arise in a family are worked out over
periods of time.
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The data seems to offer clear support for this
hypothesis. The interaction of trial block by level
of S-E for the measure of the subject's probability of
responding cooperatively following a cooperative response
was found to be significant. This measure would seem
to be an analogue of a type of process that is quite
frequent in interpersonal interactions. It indicates
a subject's responsiveness to the other person's positive
behaviors. That is, if "A" cooperates with MB", then
MA M will expect "B" to cooperate with him. Without this,
fundamental expectation that an individual's positive
behavior would induce positive behavior in another, there
would be little chance that a mutually beneficial out-
come can be reached. Members of the high S-E families
probability of responding cooperatively following the
other person's cooperative response remained fairly con-
stant over the 50 trials, perhaps even increasing slightly.
However, the members of the low S-E families became
significantly less likely, on each successive block of
ten trials, to respond cooperatively following the other
player's cooperative response on the preceeding trial.
If these interactions are thought of not as responses
to the P.D. game, but rather as positions in an argument,
the relationship implications are quite clear. The
members of the high S-E families remain at least as likely
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to cooperate with each other in the middle and end of
the argument as they were at the beginning. However,
since the members of the low S-E families would become
progressively less likely to cooperate over time, it
would seem that the longer the argument went on, the
less likely that it would be for the members of these
families to find a mutually satisfactory solution.
Because the members of the low S-E families became less
Influenced by positive responses of other members of the
family, it would seem that their disputes would be doomed
to end in frustrating deadlocks. *
The members of the medium S-E boys' families functioned
differently on the P.D, game than did the members of the
medium S-E girls' families. The members of the male medium
S-E families functioned similarly to the members of the
high S-E families; that is, their probability of respond-
ing cooperatively after the other person responded cooper-
atively remained constant over time. The members of
the medium S-E female subjects' families became less
likely to respond cooperatively after the other person
responded cooperatively as the P.D. game continued.
The trial block by level of S-E interaction for
index Z, the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively after a response in which he defected
(responded non-cooperatively) and the other person responded
cooperatively, which resulted in his receiving the bonus
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payoff, was significant. Rapoport and Chammah (1965)
believe that this measure "indicates a willingness to
stop defecting in response to the other persons' cooper-
ative choice. It may indicate repentence or responsive-
ness." The reward structure of the P.D. game would lead
to reinforcement of the defecting response, so that
switching from the non-cooperative to the cooperative
response at this point would indicate a strong desire
to not take advantage of the other player or to show one's
willingness to enter into a more cooperative alliance.
In the present study, each S-E group seemed to have
a different pattern of response over time. The members
of the low S-E group became progressively less likely
to switch from the defecting to the cooperative response.
This pattern seems to indicate an orientation in which
the members of the low S-E families were progressively
less responsive to the other person and primarily con-
cerned with obtaining the maximum benefit for themselves
with little consideration for the other family member
with whom they were playing.
The members of the medium S-E families initially
became more likely to respond cooperatively after they
had defected and received the bonus payoff. However,
after the second block of ten trials, they also became
increasingly less likely to cooperate after receiving
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the bonus payoff as a result of their non-cooperative
response. The members of the medium S-E families seem
to quickly fall into a pattern of placing their own
advantage above that of the other person. In terms of
a learning model, it would seem that the members of the
medium and low S-E families quickly learn not to cooperate
with the other members of their families in order to
obtain the maximum individual gain.
The members of the high S-E families became increasingly
more cooperative during the first thirty trials. During
the next ten trials they became less likely to respond
cooperatively after they had defected and in the last
ten trials, they again became much more likely to cooper-
ate after receiving the bonus for defecting. Their
response over time seems to be considerably more variable
than were the response curves for the medium and low
S-E family members. It would seem that the members of
the high S-E families learned to resist the temptation
of the bonus in points for themselves and rather responded
to the potential for a mutually cooperative, mutually
beneficial interaction that can be arrived at if each
player is willing to put aside his own"selfish" wish
to achieve a maximum score while the other person receives
a minimum score.
Patterns of Intrafamlllal Interaction: One of the
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assumptions made by almost all family theorists (Vogel
& Bell, I960 ; Murrell & Stachowlak, 1965; Handel, 1965)
is that the child's emotional problems or lack of adjust-
ment is a function of a problem in the larger family
group, most typically in the relationship between the
parents. The most specific statement of this aspect
of family theory is that the problem between the parents
is displaced upon the child, that is, the child becomes
the scapegoat (Vogel & Bell, i960). The function of
this process of scapegoating is that it allows the
family structure to continue and avoids the stress
associated with open conflict between the parents. It
was, therefore, expected that the parents of the low
S-E children would have more conflict in their interactions
than the parents of the medium and high S-E children.
Hypothesis 4 stated that: In the interactions between
the parents of the low S-E children there will be lower
probabilities of responding cooperatively and lower
probabilities of responses which would resolve conflict
or increase cooperation, than in the interactions between
the parents of the medium and high S-E children.
On the F and Y indices, the interaction which contains
the parental dyad's game was significant, F is a measure
of the probability that the subject will respond cooper-
atively following the other player, the spouse's non-
cooperative response on the preceeding trial, Y is a
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measure of the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a play in which he chose cooper-
atively and the other player chose non-cooperatively
{
that is, following a play in which he received the "sucker's"
payoff. Measure F is the more inclusive measure since it
takes into account trials in which both the subject and
the other player chose non-cooperatively. Both measures
reflect the way one parent responds to the other parent's
non-cooperative response. Low probabilities on either
measure may be thought of as reflecting vengefulness
or retaliation as a way of responding to the other's
non-cooperative response. High probabilities on these
measures may be thought of as reflecting according to
Rapoport and Chammah (1965)* "either forgiveness or
martyrdom, or a strong faith in teaching by example, or
perhaps stupidity, depending on the ethical values of
whoever evaluates this behavior,"
The fathers of the low S-E boys were significantly
less likely to respond cooperatively after their wives
responded non-cooperatively (F) than were the fathers
of the high and medium S-E boys. The mothers of the
low S-E boys were significantly more cooperative than
the mothers of the medium self-esteem boys, but about
as likely to respond cooperatively after their husbands'
non-cooperative response as the mothers of the high S-E
boys. The mothers of the low self-esteem boys were
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significantly more likely to respond cooperatively after
receiving the "sucker's" payoff (Y) when playing with
their husbands than were the mothers of the medium and
high S-E boys. This is exactly opposite of what was
predicted. The fathers of the low self-esteem boys
were significantly less cooperative than the fathers
of the medium S-E boys but not of the high self-esteem
boys on this measure (Y).
The fathers of the low S-E girls were significantly
more likely to respond cooperatively after their spouse
responded non-cooperatively than were the fathers of
the high and medium S-E girls. This would also appear
to directly contradict the prediction in hypothesis 4-.
There was little difference between the probability that
the mothers of the high, medium and low S-E girls
would respond cooperatively following their husband's
non-cooperative response on the preceeding trial.
If conflict was defined in terms of non-cooperation,
there would be relatively weak support for the notion
that there is greater conflict within the parental dyad
of low S-E children as compared to that of the medium
and high S-E children. It would appear that the data
does support the hypothesis; however, the measure of
conflict that seems appropriate is not the simple measure
of non-cooperation.
Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967) believe that
123
all communi catlonal Interchanges and, therefore, all
relationships can be divided into two categories; they
are either symmetrical or complementary. These authors
state that: "They can be described as relationships based
on either equality or difference. In the first case,
the partners tend to mirror each other's behavior, and
thus, their behavior can be termed symmetrical. Weakness
or strength, goodness or badness are not relevant here,
for equality can be maintained in any of these areas.
In the second case, one partner's behavior complements
that of the other, forming a different sort of behavioral
Gestalt, and is called complementary. Symmetrical inter-
action, then, is characterized by equality and the
minimization of difference, while complementary inter-
action is based on the maximization of difference.
"
Applying this framework to the relationships between
the parents in the P.D. game, it would not be the absolute
probability of cooperation that would be important, but
rather the difference between each partner's probability
of responding cooperatively which would define their
relationship as either symmetrical or complementary.
There was no significant difference between the
mothers' and fathers' probability of responding cooper-
atively following a non-cooperative response by their
spouse in the male and female high and medium S-E groups.
This relationship existed for both measure P and measure
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Y. The parents of the medium and high S-E children would
then have a symmetrical relationship, that is, a relation-
ship between equals.
However, there was a significant difference between
the mothers' and fathers' probability of responding cooper-
atively following a non-cooperative response by their
spouse in the male and female low S-E groups. This relation-
ship existed for both measure p and measure Y. Accord-
ing to the way the parents of the low S-E children played
the P.D. game, this parental relationship may be described
as complementary or as one based on differences or an
Inequality.
In any complementary relationship there are two
different positions which have been described (Watzlawick,
Beavin & Jackson, 1967) as the “superior, primary or
"one-up" position and the other corresponding inferior,
secondary, or "one-down" position." It is important
to recognize that these descriptive terms do not connote
concepts like good and bad, or strong and weak. These
relationship patterns or roles typically are thought
of as fitting with each other in a homeostatic way.
For example, in the present study, one member of the
parental dyad of the low S-E children was significantly
less cooperative than the other; it would be simplistic
to assume that the one that was less cooperative is the
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’'bad" or "strong" member of the dyad. The less cooper-
ative member of the dyad will be referred to as the one
who is in the one-up position and the more cooperative
member as being in the one-down position. (However, the
assignment of these labels is arbitrary and, in fact,
the opposite assignment could have also been made.)
In the parental dyad of the low S-E boys, the
father assumes the one-up position. He was very unlikely
to respond cooperatively after his wife responded non-
cooperatively. The mother is in the one-down position,
having been more likely than her husband to respond
cooperatively following his non-cooperative response.
It is interesting to note that she was more likely to
respond cooperatively following a trial in which her
husband's non-cooperative response resulted in a greater
negative payoff for her.
In the parental dyad of the low S-E girl the father is
in the one-down position, that is, he is the more cooper-
ative member of the dyad. He, too, was also more likely
to respond cooperatively following a trial in which his
wife's non-cooperative response rsulted in a greater
negative payoff for him. The mother of the low S-E girl
was significantly less cooperative than her husband.
It was predicted that there would be greater probabil-
ities of cooperative responses in the interactions between
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the high S-E child and the same sex parent than In the
Interactions between the medium and low S-E children
and their parents. The relationship between the boy
and his father will be discussed first and then the
relationship between the girl and her mother.
Hypothesis 5a stated thati The Interactions between
the fathers and sons of the high S-E families will be
characterized by greater probabilities of cooperative
responses and higher probabilities of responses that
would reduce conflict than In the Interactions between
the medium and low S-E boys and their fathers. This
hypothesis was confirmed.
The fathers of the high S-E boys were slgnlfIcantly
more likely to respond cooperatively following a non-
cooperative response by their son (P) than were the
fathers of the medium and low S-E boys. The high S-E
boys were significantly more likely to respond cooper-
atively following a non-cooperative response by their
fathers than were the medium or low S-E boys. It would
appear that both members of the high S-E father-son
dyad acted as If they had confidence that the other
member would not continue responding non-cooperatlvely.
This would also seem to imply that the high S-E boy
and his father have a warmer and, perhaps, closer
relationship with each other than do the medium and low
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self-esteem boys and their fathers.
On measure Y, the probability that the subject would
respond cooperatively following a trial in which he
received the "sucker's" payoff, there were no significant
differences between the three groups of boys or between
the three groups of fathers. However, when each group
of boys were compared with their fathers, there appeared
to be an Interesting and important difference between
the high and medium S-E groups and the low S-E groups.
The fathers of the high and medium S-E boys were significant-
ly more likely to respond cooperatively after receiving
the "sucker's" payoff than were their sons. The relation-
ship between the high and medium S-E sons and their fathers,
on this measure, was complementary. The relationship
between the low S-E boys and their fathers was symmetrical,
that is, their probabilities of responding cooperatively
after the other had responded non-cooperatively was
statistically equivalent.
Hypothesis 5b stated that* The Interactions between
the mothers and daughters of the high S-E families will
be characterized by greater probabilities of cooperative
responses and high probabilities of responses that would
reduce conflict than in the interactions between the
medium and low S-E girls and their mothers. The data
supporting this hypothesis are considerably less clear
than for the related hypothesis for boys.
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The high S-E girls were significantly more likely
to respond cooperatively following a non-cooperative
response by their mothers than were either the medium
or low S-E girls. This may indicate that high S-E
girls feel closer to their mothers and trust that their
mothers will not continue to respond in a non-cooperative
way.
There was no significant difference between the
probabilities of the three groups of female subjects'
mothers in their likelihood of responding cooperatively
following a non-cooperative response by their daughters.
On the measure of the mothers' probability of responding
cooperatively following a play on which they responded
cooperatively and their daughters responded non-cooperatively
(following a play on which they received the "sucker's"
payoff), the mothers of the medium S-E girls were signif-
icantly less likely to respond cooperatively than were
the mothers of the high and low S-E girls.
One of the unexpected findings of the present study
was the non-cooperative or competitive orientation of
the medium S-E girls. Perhaps mothers of medium S-E
girls are, as the data would seem to indicate, more
competitive than either the mothers of high and low
S-E girls. This finding will be discussed in a later
section
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b) THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION.
There are two models for the development of
emotional problems in children (Ross, 1964; Handel,
1965; Hobbs, 1966 ). The more traditional model views
present childhood emotional problems as a function of
past events in the child's life. The alternative family-
centered model of the etiology of childhood psychological
problems, views the present behavior of the child as
a function of current behavioral events within the family
system. The present study may be thought of as an attempt
to explore and confirm some of the derivative hypotheses
of the family-centered model. It was anticipated
that there would be differences in the way members of
high, medium, and low S-E families interacted with each
other on the P.D. game.
One of the central concepts of family theory (Haley,
1962; Murrell & Stachowiak, 1965
1
Vogel & Bell, I960)
is that the parents of emotionally disturbed children
experience a conflict in their relationship with each
other and in order to minimize the potentially destructive
effects of this conflict they scapegoat one of their
children and focus on his "difficulties" as a means of
avoiding their own conflict. The findings of the present
study would seem to, not only confirm the notion that
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there is greater conflict between the parents of the
low S-E children, but also to give additional informat-
ion about the nature of this conflict, and, perhaps,
help to partially answer the question of why a particular
child becomes scapegoated.
The finding that the parents of the high and medium
S-E children have a symmetrical relationship in the
way they play the P.D. game as opposed to the complementary
relationship that appears to exist between the parents
of the low S-E children would appear to be quite import-
ant. The parents of the high and medium S-E children
Interact with each other as if they have a relationship
between equals. The parents of the low S-E children
behave with each other on the P.D. game, as if they
have a relationship between non-equals. Bandura ( 1 969
)
suggests that the child learns much of his social behavior
and expectations through modeling and vicarious learning.
One way that the child learns what he can expect in the
world at large is through observing the interactions
within his family; therefore, the low S-E child's model
of interpersonal relations would be considerably different
from that which the high and medium S-E child learns.
Rather than learning that he can expect to be treated
as an equal by his peers, the low S-E child would learn
that interpersonal relationships take a complementary
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form with one person taking the one-up position while
the other person assumes the one-down position.
Prom the data that was obtained, it would seem
that one concomitant condition for a child to have low
S-E or emotional difficulties would be that his parents
have a complementary as opposed to a symmetrical
relationship. It would appear that perhaps conflict
or argument is in itself not the significant factor,
but rather that the relationship is one between unequal
partners as opposed to a relationship between equals
as would appear to exist between the parents of the
high and medium S-E children.
In the parental dyad of the low S-E male and female
subjects there was a reversal of the parent who was in
the one-up and one-down position. That is, for the
parents of the low S-E boys, the father was in the one-
up position responding in a vengeful or retaliatory
way to his wife's non-cooperative responses. The mother
of the low S-E boys was in the one-down position. It
is interesting that the data may indicate that this is
a position that she was not passively taking, but per-
haps actively maintains. This position might be thought
of as that of a martyr. She was considerably more
likely to respond cooperatively after receiving the
"sucker's" payoff than after both she and her husband
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responded non-cooperatively. She became more cooper-
ative after she had received more "punishment", perhaps
very willingly "turning the other cheek,"
These positions were reversed in the parental
dyad of the low S-E girl. Here it was the mother who
was in the one-up position, being relatively less cooper-
ative and, therefore, relatively more vengeful in her
responses to her husband's non-cooperative response.
The husband, who was in the one-down position, apparently
maintains this position by choosing the strategy of the
"martyr" and becoming more likely to respond cooperatively
as he was "punished" more. Another way of describing
the partner who is in the one-down position is that he
(she) has a "strong faith in teaching by example,"
However, the discrepancies between the two parents' probab-
ilities were so large, especially in comparison to the
equal probabilities in the symmetrical parental dyads
of the high and medium S-E children, that it is strange
that the parent in the one-down position had not decided
that his (her) noble strategy was not effective.
The question of why a particular child in a family
becomes emotionally disturbed or scapegoated has not
been adequately answered. The data obtained in this
study indicates a possible relationship between the sex
of the low S-E child and his parents' relationship.
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No clear answer to this question is offered here
because there Is only data available on one child in
each family. It is not known whether the other children
in the families of the low S-E children also experience
adjustment difficulties.
It would seem that the child of the same sex as
the parent in the one-up position, that is the parent
who is less likely to cooperate or who is relatively
more vengeful in his interaction with his or her spouse,
will have low S-E. Possibly the low S-E boy or girl
is unable to establish an identification with the
parent of the same sex because to do so would place him
in an antagonistic relationship with the parent of the
opposite sex. It could also be possible that the parents
more actively displace the conflict on the child of the
same sex as the relatively more antagonistic parent.
The important finding would seem to be that it is the
parent of the same sex as the low S-E child who is in
the one-up position and the parent of the opposite sex
who is in the one-down position, in the parents' relation-
ship with each other.
It should not be concluded that the parent who is
in the one-up position has greater power or control over
the other parent. The relationships between the parents
of the low S-E children can be thought of as under mutual
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control. It would seem that the parent who occupies
the one-down position is using the strategy of a "martyr."
Thus, this parent might be actively seeking defeat as
a way to achieve victory or control of the relationship.
That the parent in the one-down position does not change
strategy would seem to lock both partners into the com-
plementary relationship. It seems naive to assume that
it was the one-up or non-cooperative parent who was
responsible for the complementary relationship.
The hypotheses which predicted that in their over-
all performance the members of the low S-S families would
have been less cooperative than the members of the medium
and high S-E families were not confirmed. However, when
rates of cooperative behavior were viewed as a function
of trial blocks or time, significant differences between
the high, medium, and low S-E groups were found. The
members of the high S-E families remain fairly constant
in the probability that they will respond cooperatively
to another member's cooperative response and they also
seemed to be able to resist a greater personal reward
for one that would be beneficial to both family members.
Thus, the members of the high S-E children's families
seem to respond in a way that would more likely be
beneficial to themselves and the other family members.
This would seem to indicate a pattern of mutual support,
gain, and trust in the families of high S-E children.
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In the families of low S-E children the probabilities
of cooperating as a function of time seemed to portend
a pattern of increasingly less concern for the other
family member and greater concern for individual gain.
It would seem that this pattern would indicate progressive
fragmentatl on of the family system as a group and greater
emphasis on each individual obtaining what he can.
Thus, the interactions in the families of the low S-E
children would seem to have low levels of trust and mutual
concern, perhaps, supporting the notion of "every man
for himself."
There are interesting implications of these differ-
ent temporal patterns of cooperation for family behavior.
For the low S-E subjects' families, the pattern of
being less likely to cooperate and being more concerned
over individual rather than group gain as the process
proceeds over time, may be viewed as an "absorbing chain"
(Raush, 1969) which will eventuate in extremely low
probabilities of cooperating and resolving mutual
differences. If this model is an accurate description
of the process in these families, then whenever events
in which there is disagreement occur in these families,
the result will be greater disagreement and eventual
personal dissatisfaction.
Ferreira and Winter ( 1966 ) have consistently
found that the members of families classified as "abnormal"
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have had less "spontaneous agreement" with each other
and have taken longer to make decisions than do the
members of families classified as "normal." There
would then seem to be more opportunity in the less well
adjusted families to become involved in the type of
"absorbing chain" which was described and which would
lead to very low rates of mutual cooperation and mutual
benefit
.
Such processes may be accompanied by the following
types of statements by family members: "My view is never
taken as valid. They never listen to me. You always
have to have your own way." It would also be expected
that a great deal of frustration and anger would accompany
these states. Individuals exposed to this process
would probably feel little trust and a great deal of
suspicion toward people. Clinical observers (Haley &
Hoffman, 1967) of families in therapy have frequently
noted that the members of these families minimally comment
on other members' communicative behavior. This may be
a means of avoiding entry into the type of non-rewarding,
"absorbing chain" that was observed in the performance
of the low S-E subjects.
The state of affairs in the families of the high
S-E male and female subjects' families is considerably
different. The process of interaction here is not an
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absorbing chain#" That is, as people interact over
time, the probability remains relatively constant that
one will respond positively to another's positive
response and the goal seems to be one of mutual gain
as opposed to individual gain. The result of this
process would seem to be that individuals would have
trust in the possibility of a positive outcome in their
interactions with other people. Their attitudes and
behavior would reflect this trust as well as a concern
for the other person.
The level of cooperation for the children was not
a linear function of the level of S-E as had been pre-
dicted, but rather there was an interesting interaction
between level of S-E and the child's sex. The high S-E
boys were significantly less likely to respond cooper-
atively than were the high S-E girls or the medium S-E
boys. The medium S-E girls were significantly less
likely to respond cooperatively than were the medium
S-E boys or the high S-E girls. Both groups of low
S-E children were relatively non-cooperative. In
interpreting these findings it seemed necessary to con-
sider the influence of sex role identity. It may be
assumed that if a child's conception of himself matches
the standards that his society establishes for a member
of his sex group, this will positively influence his
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sense of S-E or self-worth.
Kagan (1964) cites a great deal of evidence supporting
his contention that: "One of the primary classes of
sex-typed behavior involves aggression. The standard
involves inhibition of verbal and physical aggression
among girls and women; but gives boys and men license-
and even encouragement- to express aggression when attacked,
threatened, or dominated by another (male).” It would
also seem that the girl's Inhibition of aggression
becomes elaborated in the feminine ideals of passivity,
affiliation and nurturance on the part of women in our
culture.
In the context of the P.D. game these differentiated
sex-typed behaviors would be reflected in the subjects'
propensity to continue to respond cooperatively. The
high S-E boy's relatively low probability of continuing
to respond cooperatively may reflect the maintenance
and assertion of an aggressive, competitive male ideal.
Similarly, the high S-E girl's relatively high probability
of persisting in the cooperative response can be thought
of as conforming to the ideal female standards of behavior.
The high rates of cooperation by the high S-E girl as
she interacts with her mother may also reflect her adoption
of this culturally endorsed female pattern of behavior.
The data from the interactions of the fathers and
sons may offer additional Information. It would be
expected that the father of a pre-adolescent boy is better
equipped to compete with his son and would be able to
defeat him in most activities. How can an explanation
be given for the high and medium S-E father being in
the one-down or more cooperative position vis-a-vis his
son? It would seem that by being less competitive with
his son, he may be enabling the son not to experience
defeat at the hands of a more powerful rival so as to
encourage competitive behavior outside of this relation-
ship. The symmetrical relationship that exists between
the low S-E boy and his father would imply a relation-
ship among equals which would probably result in com-
petitive behavior from this group of fathers with their
sons.
The data for the medium S-E children may indicate
that they have difficulty in adopting the culturally
prescribed sex role behavior. The medium S-E girls
appeared to be competitive or aggressive while the medium
S-E boys appeared to be passive and cooperative. Possibly
this lack of conformity with the socially appropriate
behavioral models would, for these children, establish
a conflict which could reduce their feelings of worth.
Coopersml th (1967) in his study of the antecedents of
self-esteem in male subjects found that "only two values-
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refinement and dancing- in which the difference between
the medium S-E group and the other groups achieved
statistical significance. " Both of these values would
appear to be feminine. Since Coopersmith' s (1967) study
did not deal with female subjects, we can only speculate
that the medium S-E girl's value orientation is most
likely closer to the masculine ideal. This suggestion
appears to be supported by the available data for the
medium S-E girls.
The medium S-E girls' non-cooperative or competitive
orientation may be thought of as being modeled directly
upon their mothers' competitive orientation. One
would then question whether these mothers have more doubts
about the traditional female role than their counter-
parts in the families of the high and low S-E female
subjects. There would seem to be some additional support
for this notion in the demographic data. A significantly
greater number of the mothers of medium S-E girls than
high and low S-E girls were employed part time. This
may reflect a more competitive, masculine and less
traditional orientation by these mothers. Perhaps the
medium S-E girls' more competitive orientation is a
function of their mothers' competitiveness and non-accept-
ance of the traditional female role.
The effects of the mothers' behavior on their daughters'
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competitiveness would seem to be considerably more complex
than a simple modeling hypothesis would suggest. The
mothers of the low S-E girls had a high probability of
responding cooperatively following a trial on which they
had received the "sucker's" payoff when playing with
their daughters. However, their daughters had a very
low probability of responding cooperatively in this
situation. If the low S-E girls' behavior is compared
to their mothers' behavior in the game with the fathers,
a similarity emerges. Although the mothers of the low
S-E girls take a relatively cooperative stand in their
interactions with their daughters, they take a relatively
non-cooperative stand in the interactions with their
husbands. Thus, the question can be raised of which
set of the mothers' behaviors will the low S-E girls
choose as the more appropriate model when she is faced
with two divergent sets of behavior.
Conclusion! It would seem premature to attempt
to establish generalizations beyond those that have
already been suggested. The following areas would
seem to warrant further investigation.
The P.D. game, as well as other simulation techniques
appear to be a potentially useful methodology for the
study of current family interaction processes. The
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present experimental method may be modified to Include
a period In which the family members could negotiate
their strategies. This could be useful In both validat-
ing already formulated hypotheses, as well as adding
new Information to the study of family Interaction.
The present finding would seem to suggest that
particular attention should be given to the temporal
patterns of cooperation and competition In families.
It would also be Important to continue the Investigation
of differences In the dyadic relationship patterns such
as those found between the parents of the high, medium,
and low S-E children. In addition to this, the present
finding suggests that there Is an Interaction between
sex role and self-esteem which requires further
Investigation.
In conclusion, It would seem that the present find-
ings would offer support for the notions of family
theory. Differences between the Interaction patterns
of families with high, medium, and low S-E children
would Indicate that current Interactional behavior
within the family Is related to different levels of
a child's psychological adjustment.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
The purpose of the present study was to explore
the relationship between current interactional behavior
within a child's family and his level of self-esteem.
The child's level of self-esteem (S-E) was assessed by
the Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967) . Each
family consisted of the mother, father, and the tested
child. The families were divided into high, medium,
and low S-E groups. The groups were extremely similar
on all demographic characteristics so that the child's
level of S-E was the only variable that differentiated
the groups. Sixty "normal" families were obtained from
a suburban junior high school and were divided equally
into the six groups, three with male and three with
female children.
The families participated in an interactional task,
the prisoner's dilemma game (Rapoport & Orwant, 1962}
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 ) • The P.D. game has been
described as a mixed motive, non-zero sum game which
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establishes a conflict between the psychological states
or motives of cooperation and competition, trust, and
mistrust, etc. The assumption that is implicit in using
this simulation technique is that the subjects game
behavior is analogous to non-game, real life interactions.
No significant differences were found in the overall
levels of cooperation for the members of the high, medium,
and low S-E groups. However, when the subjects' perform-
ance was viewed as a function of time or trials, signif-
icant differences did emerge. The members of the high
S-E families were consistent in their probability of
responding cooperatively following a cooperative response
by another family member. In contrast, the members of
the low S-E families became progressively less likely
to respond cooperatively following the other family
member's cooperative response. A similar pattern was
found for the probability that the subject will respond
cooperatively following a trial in which he responded
non-cooperatively and the other family member responded
cooperatively. Again, as the game proceeded, the members
of the low S-E families were significantly less likely
to respond cooperatively, than were the members of the
high S-E families.
It is somewhat difficult to interpret the results
for the medium S-E families because there appeared to
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be a significant difference between the male and female
subjects’ families' performance on the P.D. game was
similar to that of the low S-E families, while the perform-
ance of the medium S-E male subjects' families were
similar to the high S-E families.
The differences noted were interpreted as indicating
different temporal patterns of dealing with conflict
in the families of the high, medium, and low S-E children.
It would seem that within the low S-E families, as conflict
continues over time, there would be a decreasing likelihood
that a mutually beneficial resolution would occur; that
is, the members would become more competitive, oriented
towards individual as opposed to family group gain, and
more frustrated, disappointed and angry. The members
of the high S-E families appear to be relatively
consistent in the likelihood of finding a mutually
beneficial resolution to conflict and appear to hold
mutual family group gain as a more important value than
individual gain. These differences may be generalized
to the attitudes and expectations that the children
and parents in each family group would then hold toward
society at large.
One of the most interesting findings of the present
study was related to the parents' interactions with each
other. On two measures of the probability that the
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subject would respond cooperatively following a non-
cooperative response by the other subject, there was
no significant difference between the high and medium
S-E mothers' and fathers' probabilities of responding
cooperatively. Phis type of relationship was defined
as symmetrical
,
a relationship in which each parent acts
as if he is equal to the other. However, the probabilities
of the mothers and fathers of the low S-E children were
significantly different, indicating that they may have
a complementary relationship in which one partner is
more competitive, vengeful, superior or one-up, while
the other partner is more cooperative, inferior or one-
down.
Although this complementary pattern emerged in
the relationship between the parents of the low S-E boys
and girls, the relative positions in the relationship
were reversed for the parents of the male and female
low S-E children. In the parental dyad of the low S-E
boys, the father was the one-up or more vengeful parent
while the mother was the one-down or more cooperative
parent. In the parental dyad of the low S-E girl it
was the mother who was In the one-up or relatively more
vengeful position while the father was in the one-down
or relatively more cooperative position. In both cases,
the parent in the one-down position assumed the role
14?
of "martyr," becoming more likely to cooperate as the
loss or punishment increased.
The data on the intraparental relationship were
thought to lend support to the scapegoating hypothesis
(Bell & Vogel, i960 ; Murrell & Stachowiak, 1965) which
indicates that the disturbed or poorly adjusted child's
difficulties are both a function of and a means of resolv-
ing intraparental conflict. It was suggested that the
present findings may help to answer the question of
which child would be scapegoated. The child who develops
poor adjustment would be the one who is of the same sex
as the parent in the one-up position. The conflict
between the parents would establish a difficult ident-
ification situation as well as the possibility that neg-
ative feelings may become displaced upon this child by
the parent in the one-down position.
It also appeared that the interactions between the
father and son in the low S-E families was more competitive
and less cooperative than the Interactions between the
father and son in the high and medium S-E families.
This would seem to support the notion that identification
and appropriate sex role typing is facilitated by warmth
in the same sex parent (i.e., Heatherington & Frankie,
1967). However, the relationship between the mothers
and daughters in the three S-E groups did not confirm
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this hypothesis.
The Influence of sex and sex role seems to be an
important variable in the study of the relationship of
current Interactional processes and a child's level of
S-E. There were marked differences between the performance
of the medium S-E boys and that of the girls, as well
as the other members of their families. It was suggested
that there might be a conflict and reversal between the
families' and society's definition of appropriate sex
role behavior in the medium S-E families. The male medium
S-E subjects responded as if they had a more feminine
or cooperative definition of the male role and the female
medium S-E subjects responded as if they had a more
masculine or competitive definition of the female role
than either the high S-E boys or girls who responded
in a way that would conform to the traditional sex
role behaviors. It was suggested that there was possibly
a family-society conflict in the norms of the medium
S-E families as compared to the intrafamilial conflict
in the low S-E families.
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a) SOCIO ECONOMIC INDEX.
The "father's occupational index" was based on the Hollingshead
and Redlick presentation (1968) of five levels of social class. "Class
I. This stratum is composed of wealthy families whose wealth is often
inherited and whose heads are leaders in the community's business and
professional pursuits. Class II. Adults in this stratum are almost
all college graduates; the males occupy high manegerial positions,
many are engaged in the lesser ranking professions. These families
are well to do, but there is no substantial inherited or acquired
wealth. Class III. This stratum includes the vast majority of small
proprietors, white collar office and sales workers, and a considerable
number of skilled manual workers. Adults are predominantly high school
graduates, but a considerable number have attended business schools
and small colleges for a year or two. Class IV. This stratum con-
sists predominantly of semi-skilled factory workers. Its adult mem-
bers have finished the elementary grades ... adults under thirty-five
have generally graduates from high school. Class V. Occupationally,
class V adults are overwhelmingly semi-skilled factory hands and un-
skilled laborers . Educationally most adults have not completed the
elementary grades."
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b ) SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY
.
University of Massachusetts
Educational Research Project: Form I
Name: Date:
PLEASE MARK EACH STATEMENT IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: IF THE STATEMENT
DESCRIBES HOW YOU USUALLY FEEL, PUT A CHECK (vO IN THE COLUMN "LIKE
ME." IF THE STATEMENT DOES NOT DESCRIBE HOW YOU USUALLY FEEL, PUT~A
CHECK IN THE COLUMN "UNLIKE ME ."
THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS.
LIKE ME UNLIKE ME
1 . I spend a lot of time daydreaming. V
2. I'm pretty sure of myself. xZ
3. I often wish I were someone else. xZ
4. I'm easy to like.
5. My parents and I have a lot of fun together. x/
6. I never worry about anything. xZ
7. I find it very hard to talk in front of the
class
.
s/
8. I wish I were younger. xZ
9. There are lots of things about myself I'd
change if I could. xZ__
10. I can make up my mind without too much trouble. x/
11. I'm a lot of fun to be with. x/
12. I get upset easily at home. xZ
__
13. I always do the right thing. xZ
14. I'm proud of my school work. xZ
15. Someone always has to tell me what to do. Z ...
16. It takes me a long time to get used to
anything new. xZ —
17. I'm often sorry for the things I do. xZ
18. I'm popular with kids my own age. xZ
19. My parents usually consider my feelings. xZ
20. I ' m never unhappy
.
_ _vZ ..
21. I'm doing the best work that I can. n/
22. I give in very easily. _xZ.
23. I can usually take care of myself. xZ
24. I'm pretty happy. xZ
25. I would rather play with children younger than
My parents expect too much of me. __ xZ26.
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LIKE ME UNLIKE ME
27. I like everyone I know.
vZ
28. I like to be called on in class. s/
29. I understand myself.
_v/
30. It ' s pretty tough to be me
.
Z
31. Things are all mixed up in my life.
_ .
32. Kids usually follow my ideas.
33. No one pays much attention to me at home. v/
34. I never get scolded. xZ
35. I'm not doing as well in school as I'd like
to. x/
36. I can make up my mind and stick to it. x/
37. I really don't like being a boy - girl. xZ
38. I have a low opinion of myself. xZ
39. I don't like to be with other people. xZ
4o. There are many times when I'd like to leave
home. xZ
4l. I'm never shy. N
Z
h2. I often feel upset in school. xZ
43. I often feel ashamed of myself. xZ _
44. I'm not as nice looking as most people.
__
vZ
45. If I have something to say, I usually say it
46. Kids pick on me very often.
__ _xZ_ -
47. My parents understand me. x/
48. I always tell the truth. vZ_ _
49. My teacher makes me feel I'm not good enough
50. I don't care what happens to me.
.
V .
51. I'm a failure. v/
52. I get upset easily when I'm scolded.
53. Most people are better liked than I am. jZ
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
I usually feel as if my parents are pushing
I always know what to say to people.
me. vZ
vZ
I often get discouraged in school. xZ
Things usually don't bother me. Z
I can't be depended on. :z.
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c) LETTER 1.
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST, MASSACHUSETTS
March IT, 1970
Dear Parent:
The school district is cooperating with the University of
Massachusetts in an educational research project. The general pur-
pose of this project is to investigate how children learn basic
attitudes
.
In the initial part of this study I will be administering a ques-
tionnaire to all of the seventh grade students at the J.H.S. At
this time I am asking your permission to allow your child to par-
ticipate in the questionnaire portion of this project which will be
administered in class.
Later in the year I will contact a small group of families to ask
their additional cooperation in a second part of this project.
I want to assure you that all necessary precautions will be taken
to guarantee your child’s anonymity. All of the information gath-
ered in this study will be completely confidential and will not be
made available to anyone.
Your cooperation in projects such as the present one is extremely
important and necessary if we are to expand our knowledge of human
development. Your assistance at this time is greatly appreciated
and I want to sincerely thank you for it.
Yours truly,
Joseph W. Newirth, M.S.
I will (will not) allow my son (daughter), t——\
to participate in the questionnaire portion (name)
of the University of Massachusetts educational research project de-
scribed above.
Date
:
Signed:
(parent or guardian)
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d) LETTER 2.
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST, MASSACHUSETTS
Dear Parents
:
The school district is cooperating with the University of
Massachusetts in an educational research project. The general pur-
pose of this project is to investigate how children learn "basic
attitudes and decision making.
Through the courtesy of the J.H.S., I have obtained your child's
name. I am writing for your further cooperation in completing
this study.
We have developed a game that can he played by two family members
at a time. The object of this game is for each player to get as
many points for himself as he can. However, the score that each
player gets depends not only on the way he plays , but also on the
way his partner plays the game. We are interested in studying the
techniques that different family members use while playing this
game. The families that have already played this game have found
it quite enjoyable.
I want to assure you that all necessary precautions will be taken
to guarantee your family’s anonymity. All of the information gath-
ered in this study will be completely confidential and will not be
made available to anyone.
This study will require only one and a half hours of time when
both of you and your child will be available. I will be able to
your home at a time that is convenient for you. It is only through
the kind cooperation of people like you that we will be able to
expand our understanding of human development and thus be able to
continue to make the strides in science that will benefit us all.
Since we have a very small budget for this study we have decided to
give one of the sixty families that participate a fifty dollar
savings bond. The family that gets this prize will be selected
randomly from those that participate.
I hope that you decide to participate in this study. I think
that
you will find it both interesting and enjoyable. I will call you
160
within the next week and I hope that we can arrange a suitable
time. Your assistance is greatly appreciated and T want to sin-
cerely thank you for it.
Yours truly.
Joseph W. Newirth, M.S.
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e) Table A: Number of families contacted and percent that par-
ticipated for the male and female subjects of each
self-esteem group.
MALE FEMALE
Self-Esteem Number
Contacted
Percent
participated
Number
contacted
Percent
participated
High 12 83 lb 76
Medium lb 76 22 ^5
Low 19 53 16 63
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APPENDIX B
a)
Table
B:
Per
cent
of
S's
responding
"like
me'
to
S.E.T.
in
three
S-E
groups
of
male
and
female
seventh-grade
children.
Percentages
based
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25
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S-E
by
sex
group.
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-
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always
do
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I
understand
myself.
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES
Table Cl Analysis of Variance for measure A; the probability that
the player responds cooperatively following the other player's
cooperative response.
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
1. Total 1799
2. Between subjects 179
3. Sex (S) 1 .374 1.36
4. Self-esteem (S-E) 2 .496 1.82
5. Role (R) 2 .389 1.43
6. S X S-E 2 .473 1.73
7. S X R 2 .103 .38
8. S-E X R k .l4l .52
9. S X S-E X R k .323 1.18
10. Error (N/SS-ER) 162 .273
11. Within subjects 1620
12, Dyadic partner (DP) 1 2.000 11.49
******
13. DP X S 1 •
00
i-* 5.12 ***
Ik. DP X S-E 2 .003
.02
15. DP X R 2 .173
.98
16. DP X S X S-E 2 .329
1.89
17. DP X S X R 2
.032 .18
18. DP X S-E X R k .095
.55
19. DP X S X S-E X R k
.195 1.12
168
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
20. Error (N X DP/SS-ER) 162 .17*+
21. Trial block (T) k .576 9.1k ******
22. T X S k .101 1.60
23. T X S-E 8 .212 3.35 ******
2h
. T X R 8 .066 1.05
25. T X S X S-E 8 .lU8 2.33 ***
26. T X S X R 8 .039 .62
27. T X S-E X R 16 .030 .U 8
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .082 1.30
29. Error (T X N/SS-ER) 6 U8 .063
30. DP X T k .080 l.l4
31. DP X T X S k .138 1.97
*
32. DP X T X S-E 8 .162 2.31
***
33. DP X T X R 8 .052 .81
3k. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .195 2.78
*****
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .053 .76
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16 .023 .33
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .082 1.17
38 . Error 6U8 .070
(N X DP X T/SS-ER)
* p .10
**** p .01
** p .05
***** p .005
*** v .025
****** p .001
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Table D« Analysis of Variance for measure B, the probability that
a subject will follow his own cooperative response with a cooperative
response.
SOURCE OF DEGREES MEAN F
VARIANCE OF SQUARE
FREEDOM
1. Total 1799
2. Between subjects 179
3. Sex (s) 1
4. Self-esteem (S-E) 2
5. Role (R) 2
6. S X S-E 2
7. S X R 2
8. E X R 4
9. S X S-E X R 4
10. Error (N/SS-ER) 162
11. Within subjects 1620
12. Dyadic partner (DP) 1
13. DP X S
14. DP X E
15. DP X R
16. DP X S X E
17. DP X S X R
DP X S-E X R
.007
.102
2.237
. 432
.098
.198
.473
.213
.876
.002
.088
.186
.110
.001
.118
.03
.48
10.50
2.03
.46
.93
2.22
8.04
.02
.81
1.70
1.10
.01
1.08
******
*
*****
18.
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SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
19. DP X S X S-E X R 4
.100
• 92
20. Error (NDP/SS-ER) 162
.109
21. Trial block (T) k .kho 8.80 ******
22. T X S k
.051 1.02
23. T X E 8
.078 1.56
24. T X R 8 .027 .52
25. T X S X S-E 8 .046 .92
26. T X S X R 8 .104 2.08 **
27. T X S-E X R 16 .070 1.4o
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .060 1.20
29. Error (TN/SS-ER) 648 .050
30. DP X T k .004 .08
31. DP X T X S k .131 2.51 **
32. DP X T X E 8 .054 1.04
33. DP X T X R 8 .030 .58
3k. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .049 .94
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .024 .46
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16 .056 1.08
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .064 1.23
38. Error 6k8 .052
(N X DP X T/SS-ER)
* p .10 **** p .01
** p .05
***** p .005
*** p .025
****** p .001
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Table Et Analysis of variance for measure E; the probability that
the subject will respond non-cooperatively following his own non-
cooperative response on the preceeding trial.
SOURCE OF DEGREES MEAN F
VARIANCE OF SQUARE
FREEDOM
1. Total
2 . Between subjects
3. Sex (S)
4. Self-esteem (S-E)
5. Role (R)
6. S X S-E
7. S X R
8. S-E X R
9. S X S-E X R
10. Error (N/SS-ER)
11 . Within subjects
12 . Dyadic partner (DP)
13. DP X S
14. DP X S-E
15. DP X R
16. DP X S X S-E
17. DP X S X R
18. DP X S-E X R
DP X S X S-E X R
1799
179
1 .002 .03
2 .oo4 .06
2 .032 .47
2 .255 3.74
2 .028 .41
U .028 .41
4 .064 • 94
162 .068
1620
1 .184 4.29
1 .037 .86
2 .017 .39
2 .037 .86
2 .029 .67
2 .031 .72
4 .060 1.39
4 .024 .50
***
**
19.
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SOURCE OF DEGREES MEAN F
VARIANCE OF SQUARE
FREEDOM
20. Error (NDP/SS-ER) 162 .043
21. Trial block (T) 4 .043 3.58 *****
22. T X S 4 .008 .67
23. T X E 8 .018 1.50
24 . T X R 8 .003 .25
25. T X S X S-E 8 .016 1.33
26. T X S X R 8 .017 1.4l
27. T X S-E X R 16 .010 .83
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .013 1.08
29. Error (TN/SS-ER) 648 .012
30. DP X T 4 .007
.58
31. DP X T X S 4 .051
4.25 *****
32. DP X T X E 8
.009 .75
33. DP X T X R 8
IfNOO• .42
34. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .009
.75
35. DP X T X S X R
8 .007 .58
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16
.013 1.08
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16
.009
38 . Error
(N X DP X T/SER) 648 .012
* p .10
** p .05
*** p .025
**** p
***** p
****** p
.01
.005
.001
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Table Pj Analysis of Variance for measure F; the probibility that
a subject responds cooperatively following the other player’s non-
cooperative response.
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
1 . Total 1799
2. Between subjects 179
3. Sex (S) 1 .592 2.59
1+. Self-esteem (S-E) 2 .235 1.03
5. Role (R) 2 . 1+ 1+8 1.96
6. S X S-E 2 .iho .61
7. S X R 2 .353 1.59
8. S-E X R 1+ .115 .51
9. S X S-E X R 1+ .U82 2.11
*
10. Error (N/SS-ER) 162 .228
11. Within subjects 1620
12. Dyadic partner (DP) 1 1.025 9.76
*****
13. DP X S 1 .202 1.92
ll+. DP X S-E 2 .023 .22
15. DP X R 2 .261
2.U8 *
16. DP X S X S-E 2 .111 1.06
17. DP X S X R 2 0
.13
18. DP X S-E X R u .081 .77
19.
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SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
20. Error (NDP/SS-ER) b
.105
21. Trial Block (T) b
.410 10.79 ******
22. T X S b
.030
.79
23. T X S-E 8 .028
.73
24. T X R 8 .014
.37
25. T X S X S-E 8
.059 1.55
26
. T X S X R 8 .035 .92
27. T X S-E X R l6 .058 1.55 *
28. T X S X S-E X R l6 .048 1.26
29. Error (TN/SS-ER) 648 .038
30. DP X T 1+ .056 1.36
31. DP X T X S 4 .010 .24
32. DP X T X E 8 .041 1.00
33. DP X T X R 8 .036 .89
34. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .080 1.95 **
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .042 1.02
36. DP X T X S-E X R l6 .037 .90
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .045 1.09
38. Error 648 .041
(NDPT/SS-ER)
* p .10
**** P .01
*# P .05 ***** P .005
*** P .025
****** P .001
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Tabic Gj Analysis of Variance for measure X; the probability thatthe subject will respond cooperatively after both he and the otherplayer responded cooperatively.
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES MEAN
OF SQUARE
FREEDOM
F
1. Total
2. Between subjects
3. Sex (S)
4. Self-esteem (S-E)
5. Role (R)
6. S X S-E
7. S X R
8. S-E X R
9. S X E X R
10. Error (N/SS-ER)
11. Within Subjects
12. Dyadic partner (DP)
13. DP X S
14. DP X S-E
15. DP X R
16. DP X S X S-E
17. DP X S X R
18. DP X S-E X R
DP X S X S-E X R
1799
179
1
2
2
2
2
4
4
162
1620
1
1
2
2
2
2
4
4
.076
.123
2.957
.760
.120
.855
.756
.533
3.575
.111
.027
.165
.668
.078
.150
.171
.14
.23
5.55 *****
1.42
.22
1.60
1.42
9.99 *****
.31
.08
.46
1.86
.22
.42
.4819.
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SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
20. Error (NDP/SS-ER) 162
.358
21. Trial Block (T) h
.733 3.59
22. T X S h
.251 1.26
23. T X S-E 8 .280 l.4i
24. T X R 8 .127
.63
25. T X S X S-E 8
.307 1.55
26
. T X S X R 8 .407 2.05
27. T X S-E X R 16 .087 .44
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .135 .67
29. Error (TN/SS-ER) 648 .198
30. DP X T k .129
.57
31. DP X T X S k .297 1.32
32. DP X T X E 8 .240 1.12
33. DP X T X R 8 .112 .50
34. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .542 2.42
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .062 .28
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16 .243 1.08
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .395 1.79
38. Error 648 .224
(NDPT/SS-ER)
*P .10 ****p .01
**p .05 *»***p .005
***p
.025 ******p .001
****
**
***
*****
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Table Hj Analysis of Variance for measure Y; the probability that
a subject will respond cooperatively following a play in which he
choose cooperatively and the other player responded non-cooperatively
.
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
1. Total 1799
2. Between subjects 179
3. Sex (S) 1 .373 .9*4
*4
.
Self-esteem (S-E) 2 .110 .28
5. Role (R) 2 1.95*4 *4.95 ******
6. S X S-E 2 .956 2. *41 *
7. S X R 2 .U9U 1.2*4
8. S-E X R u .693 1.7*»
9. S X S-E X R b .617 1.55
10. Error (N/SS-ER) 162 .398
11. Within subjects 1620
12. Dyadic partner (DP) 1 .881 3.22
*
13. DP X S 1 .103 .38
1*4. DP X S-E 2 .928 3.39
**
15. DP X R 2 .012
.05
16 . DP X S X S-E 2 .1438
1.6l
17. DP X S X R 2 .163
.59
18. DP X E X R *4 .156
.57
19. DP X S X S-E X R b
.7*45 2.72
**
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
20. Error (NDP/SS-ER) 162
.273
21. Trial block (T) 4
.932 5.42 ******
22. T X S 4
.053 .37
23. T X S-E 8 .216 1.24
24. T X R 8 .156 .89
25. T X S X S-E 8 .145
.83
26. T X S X R 8 .403 2.31 **
27. T X S-E X R 16 .145 .83
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .221 1.27
29. Error (TN/SS-ER) 648 .174
30. DP X T 4 .023 .12
31. DP X T X S 4 .125 .65
32. DP X T X S-E 8 .157 .83
33. DP X T X R 8 .161 .84
3k. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .129 .68
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .343 1.79 *
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16 .132 .69
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .142 .74
38. Error
(NDPT/SS-ER)
648 .191
*
**
***
p .10
P .05
p .025
**** p
***** T ,
****** r
.01
.005
.001
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Table I ? Analysis of Variance for measure Z; the probability that
a subject will respond cooperatively following a play in which he
responded non-cooperatively and the other player responded coop-
eratively.
SOURCE OF DEGREES MEAN F
VARIANCE OF SQUARE
FREEDOM
1. Total
2. Between subjects
3. Sex (S)
4. Self-esteem (S-E)
5. Role (R)
6. S X S-E
T. S X R
8. S-E X R
9. S X S-E X R
10. Error (N/SS-ER)
11. Within subjects
12. Dyadic partner (DP)
13. DP X S
lk. DP X S-E
15. DP X R
16. DP X S X S-E
IT. DP X S X R
18. DP X S-E X R
DP X S X S-E X R
1799
179
1
2
2
2
2
k
k
162
1620
1
1
2
2
2
2
k
k
.151 .14
1.867 1.79
.486 .47
.001 .01
.497 .48
.502 .48
1.661 1.59
1.043
4.496
.096
.527
.214
.651
.567
. 71^
1.340
5.16 ***
.11
.61
.25
.75
.65
.81
1.5>*
19.
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SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
20. Error (NDP/SS-ER) 162
.871
21. Trial "block (T) 4 3.214 5,85 ******
22. T X S 4
.593 .98
23. T X S-E 8 1.360 2.47 ***
24. T X R 8 .406
.74
25. T X S X S-E 8 .691 1.26
26. T X S X R 8 .323 • 59
27. T X S-E X R 16 .608 1.11
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .278 .51
29. Error (TN/SS-ER) 648 .549
30. DP X T 4 .782 1.39
31. DP X T X S 4 .628 1.12
32. DP X T X S-E 8 .393 .70
33. DP X T X R 8 .230 .41
34. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .165 .29
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .599 1.06
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16 .453 .81
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .867 1.54 <
38. Error
(NDPT/SS-ER)
648 .561
* p .10
**** p .01
** p .05
***** ^ .005
***
t> .025 ****** p .001
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I?
ble
-u
J
4
; Analysis of Variance for measure W; the probability thatthe subject responds cooperatively following a trial in which both he
and the other player responded non-cooperatively
.
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
1. Total
2. Between subjects
3. Sex (s)
4. Self-esteem (S-E)
5. Role (R)
6. S X S-E
7. S X R
8. S-E X R
9. S X S-E X R
10. Error (N/BS-ER)
11. Within subjects
12. Dyadic Partner (DP)
13. DP X S
14. DP X S-E
15. DP X R
16. DP X S X S-E
17. DP X S X R
18. DP X S-E X R
19. DP X S X S-E X R
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
1799
179
1 5.368 3.75
2 .958 .67
2 2.256 1.57
2 2.032 1.42
2 .697 .48
4 .842
.59
4 2.356 1.78
162 1.430
1620
1 1.514 1.50
1 1.427 1.42
2 .172 .17
2 3.839 3.82
2 .001 .01
2 .883 .88
4 .792 .79
4 1.002 .99
*
***
182
SOURCE OF
VARIANCE
DEGREES
OF
FREEDOM
MEAN
SQUARE
F
20. Error (N X DP/SS-ER) 162 1.007
21. Trial block (T) b 2.430 3.97 *****
22. T X S b
.231 .38
23. T X S-E 8 .398 .65
24. T X R 8 .698 1.11
25. T X S X S-E 8 .523 • 85
26. T X S X R 8 .171 .28
27. T X S-E XR 16 .813 1.33
28. T X S X S-E X R 16 .487 .79
29. Error (T X N/SS-ER) 648 .612
30. DP X T b .438 .75
31. DP X T X S b .586 1.00
32. DP X T X S-E 8 .482 .82
33. DP X T X R 8 .454 .76
3b. DP X T X S X S-E 8 .753 1.26
35. DP X T X S X R 8 .841 1.43
36. DP X T X S-E X R 16 .319 .55
37. DP X T X S X S-E X R 16 .902 1.5b *
38. Error
(N X DP X TfSS-ER)
«
648 • \j\ 00 vn
* p .10
** p .05
*** p .025
**** p
***** v
****** p
.01
.005
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